

When the Role Fits:  
Increasing Demand in Negotiation  
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## ABSTRACT

### When the Role Fits: Increasing Demand in Negotiation

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Does adoption of one negotiator role or the other matter for negotiation? In negotiations emphasizing a single issue, role predicts negotiator frame. When the negotiation emphasizes price, buyers adopt non-loss/loss frames whereas sellers adopt gain/non-gain frames (Studies 2 & 4). Studies 1 and 2 investigate whether a match between role and regulatory focus creates regulatory fit (Higgins, 2000). In price negotiations, prevention buyers and promotion sellers are in *focus-role* fit whereas promotion buyers and prevention sellers are in non-fit. Focus-role fit negotiators report experiencing greater fit with their role and plan to be, and actually are, more demanding.

Studies 3 and 4 clarify how focus-role fit operates. Focus-role fit intensifies negotiator responses through the regulatory fit “feeling right” experience. High assessors in focus-role fit, who are sensitive to the difference between *feeling* right and *doing* right, overcorrect the bias in their responses due to fit and show a reversal in their preparatory responses compared to low assessors in fit, who replicate the pattern of fit effects found in Studies 1 and 2 (Study 3). Focus-role fit is created through the strategic commonalities between role and regulatory focus. When strategy itself is manipulated, this commonality disappears and focus-role fit is eliminated. Instead *focus-strategy* fit and *role-strategy* fit impact experienced fit and planned demand (Study 4).

Study 5 uses a negotiation about an issue other than price. When buyers are instructed to obtain information which sellers are instructed not to reveal, role now

predicts negotiator frame in the *opposite* direction—buyers adopt gain/non-gain frames whereas sellers adopt non-loss/loss frames. Study 6 investigates role beyond single-issue, buyer-seller negotiations. In a two-issue negotiation between candidate and recruiter, role interacts with the emphasized issue to predict negotiator frame, planned demand, actual demand, and negotiated outcomes. Negotiators emphasizing their non-loss/loss issue adopt non-loss/loss frames more, are more demanding on their non-loss/loss issue, and reach better outcomes on their non-loss/loss issue than negotiators emphasizing their gain/non-gain issue.

Together, these six studies demonstrate the importance of role in negotiations. Role impacts the psychological experience of negotiation as well as negotiator behavior and outcomes.

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## DEDICATION

For my mom, Carolyn Morgan, and my dad, Bernd Appelt

Thank you both infinitely for supporting, encouraging, and inspiring me from day one.

For my grandmothers, Fern “Mimi” Morgan and Gerda “Oma” Appelt

## INTRODUCTION

Imagine you are a buyer negotiating the price of a used car. Now imagine you are the seller of that same car. Your thoughts about the negotiation probably changed. When you are the buyer, your goal is to get the best possible deal—to pay the lowest price possible. When you are the seller, your goal is still to get the best possible deal, but now this means receiving the highest price possible. It seems obvious that these roles differ in important ways. Furthermore, casual observation indicates that some people are more comfortable and better in the buyer role whereas others are more comfortable and better in the seller role. However, research on negotiations has not systematically investigated the effects of adopting one role or another. Indeed, it is often assumed that any role effects are due to the specific features of a given negotiation and that they do not generalize. The present research is thus the first to systematically explore the importance of role. In so doing, it addresses two questions simultaneously: First, how does role assignment impact negotiation? Second, why are some people better, more comfortable buyers or sellers?

Negotiation occurs whenever two or more parties with different interests come together to make a decision in common. In a classic two-party negotiation, such as our used car example, a buyer and a seller negotiate the purchase/sale of a good or service. It seems clear that these roles differ, and there has been research comparing the performance of buyers and sellers (Bazerman, Magliozzi & Neale, 1985; Drake, 2001; Huber & Neale, 1986; Kristensen & Gärling, 1997a; Van Poucke & Buelens, 2002; Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman & Carroll, 1990). However, despite calls for increased attention to negotiators' interpretation of the negotiation (see Bazerman, Curhan, Moore,



& Valley, 2000) and their motivation and goals (Thompson, 1990), few studies have looked at the effects of role assignment on negotiators' motivational states and their subsequent experience of the negotiation (for exceptions, see Cai, Wilson & Drake, 2000; Monga & Zhu, 2005; Neale, Huber & Northcraft, 1987; Schei, Rognes & Mykland, 2006). This relative dearth may be partially explained by the assumed contextualization of the buyer and seller roles. Although there are certainly role effects that are specific to each negotiation, I argue, and find, that there are also role effects that are general across negotiations. The studies presented here demonstrate systematic differences between roles in terms of how they frame negotiations and how they combine with other factors (i.e., chronic regulatory focus, assigned strategy, and emphasized issue) to impact demand and negotiated outcomes. I conclude that role is an important determinant of negotiator experiences, behavior, and outcomes across negotiations.

### Negotiator Role

As a starting point, I chose to look at one class of negotiations—the two-party, price-emphasizing distributive negotiation, a common negotiation scenario both in the real world and in the laboratory (Barry & Friedman, 1998; Blount, Thomas-Hunt & Neale, 1996; Kristensen & Gärling, 1997a, 1997b; Novemsky & Schweitzer, 2004; Van Poucke & Buelens, 2002). Such negotiations are about a single good. Because the good itself is indivisible whereas price is divisible and therefore negotiable, the negotiations center on the issue of price—they are *about* price (Higgins, 1998). There are no mutually beneficial trade-offs to expand the negotiation pie. The negotiation is instead about dividing and claiming the pie, meaning that the two negotiators' outcomes are strictly negatively correlated (i.e., in conflict) (Kristensen & Gärling, 1997a; Neale & Bazerman,

1992). The buyer wants a low price, the seller wants a high price, and so the negotiation is a zero-sum game—what one party gains, the other party loses.

Because the only attribute under contention is price, both buyer and seller naturally emphasize money (Neale et al., 1987). The buyer is trading money and only money for the receipt of the good. The seller is trading the good for the receipt of money and only money. Past research suggests that the buyer views the money to be paid as a loss, while the seller sees the money to be received as a gain (Carmon & Ariely, 2000; Monga & Zhu, 2005; Neale et al., 1987; Thaler, 1980). Buyers and sellers frame the same negotiation differently. Buyers frame the negotiation in terms of non-losses and losses whereas sellers frame the negotiation in terms of gains and non-gains (Monga & Zhu, 2005; Neale et al., 1987).<sup>1</sup>

It is critical to distinguish this from other work on frame in negotiation. Traditionally, researchers have manipulated frame. Frame is manipulated within or across role by assigning participants to negotiate profits versus costs/expenses (Bazerman, et al., 1985; De Dreu, Carnevale, Emans, & Van de Vliert, 1994; De Dreu & McCusker, 1997; Neale & Bazerman, 1985; Sondak, Neale, & Pinkley, 1995). In the present studies, frame is *measured* rather than manipulated. Rather than being assigned to one frame or the other, participants decide how to approach the negotiation. The participants themselves spontaneously represent the negotiation as a non-loss/loss situation or a gain/non-gain situation. Across studies, “negotiator frame” refers to negotiators’ self-selected framing of the negotiation. Moreover, whereas previous research has manipulated frame within or

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<sup>1</sup> These are the expected frames for a price negotiation. However, I expect frames to differ depending on what the negotiation is about. Studies 5 and 6 explore this issue through their use of other types of negotiations. For the present, I will use the example of price negotiations for simplicity.

across role, I measure framing *between* roles to assess whether buyers and sellers frame the same negotiation differently.

Given that buyers adopt non-loss/loss frames and sellers adopt gain/non-gain frames, different goals naturally arise. The buyer seeks to pay as little money as possible whereas the seller seeks to receive as much money as possible. These different goals, in turn, suggest different strategic approaches. Negotiators have at least two distinct strategies available for contemplating and pursuing negotiation: vigilance and eagerness. It should be noted that these strategies are not in conflict with other models of negotiator strategies. The strategic repertoire principle (De Dreu, Beersma, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2007) posits five strategies: contending, compromising, conceding, problem solving, and inaction. Similarly, the negotiation interact system (Donohue, 1981) suggests three “tactics:” attacking, defending, and regressing. Vigilance and eagerness are lower-level strategies that can be used in the service of either of these sets of higher-level strategies.

A vigilant strategy ensures the absence of negative outcomes (non-losses; spending only as much money as necessary). An eager strategy ensures the presence of positive outcomes (gains; receiving as much money as possible). In other words, a vigilant strategy is in the service of minimizing losses while an eager strategy is in the service of maximizing gains (Higgins, 2000). Thus, the buyer’s goal of loss-minimization is best supported by a vigilant strategy of protecting against overspending, and the seller’s goal of gain-maximization is best supported by an eager strategy of accomplishing maximum compensation. Because of their different framings of the negotiation, buyers and sellers prefer different strategies: in price negotiations, buyers

prefer vigilant means and sellers prefer eager means. These differences map neatly onto regulatory focus.

### Regulatory Focus

Regulatory focus theory posits two separate and independent self-regulatory orientations, prevention and promotion (Higgins, 1997; Higgins et al., 2001). A prevention focus emphasizes safety, the fulfillment of responsibility, and security needs. Goals are seen as oughts. There is a strategic concern with non-losses (the absence of negatives) versus losses (the presence of negatives). Prevention individuals seek to avoid mismatches to desired end-states. A promotion focus, on the other hand, emphasizes hopes, accomplishments, and advancement needs. Goals are viewed as ideals. There is a strategic concern with gains (the presence of positives) versus non-gains (the absence of positives). Promotion individuals seek to approach matches to desired end-states. Regulatory focus may be chronic (a personality variable) or momentary (situationally induced).

These self-regulatory orientations lend themselves to different strategies (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1997, 2000). A vigilant strategy, as mentioned before, ensures non-losses and ensures against losses. A prevention focus and a vigilant strategy both operate in terms of non-losses and losses, and are especially sensitive to the difference between “0” and “-1” (maintenance). An eager strategy, again as previously mentioned, ensures gains and ensures against non-gains. A promotion focus and an eager strategy both operate in terms of gains and non-gains, and are especially sensitive to the difference between “0” and “+1” (attainment) (Broscholl, Kober, & Higgins, 2007; Higgins, in press; Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2008). Thus, someone who

is chronically or situationally prevention-focused generally prefers a vigilant strategy, and someone who is chronically or situationally promotion-focused generally prefers an eager strategy (Cesario, Grant & Higgins, 2004; Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 2000).

### Regulatory Fit

Regulatory fit occurs when the manner of goal pursuit (i.e., strategy) sustains the orientation to the goal (Higgins, 2000). For example, when individuals who frame their goals as maximizing gains are able to use an eager strategy to attain those goals, they are in regulatory fit because their strategy matches their orientation. By contrast, if they frame their goals as maximizing gains but are forced to use a vigilant strategy to attain those goals, they are in a state of regulatory non-fit.

The state of regulatory fit intensifies value (Cesario et al., 2004; Higgins, 2000, 2005, 2006; Higgins, Idson, Freitas, Spiegel, & Molden, 2003). When regulatory fit occurs, people feel “right” about their response, whatever that response may be (e.g., attraction or repulsion). This feeling of rightness accentuates people’s evaluative responses to what they are doing. To be clear, regulatory fit does not alter the response valence itself; it intensifies the magnitude of the response. If the response is positive, regulatory fit will increase the positivity of the response. However, if the response is negative, regulatory fit will increase the negativity of the response (Cesario et al., 2004; Higgins, 2005, 2006).

Regulatory fit effects have been found in various domains, from leadership (e.g., Benjamin & Flynn, 2006; Kruglanski, Pierro, & Higgins, 2007) to education (e.g., Pierro, Presaghi, Higgins, & Kruglanski, 2009) to persuasion (see Cesario, Higgins, & Scholer, 2007). My research, however, is the first to explore regulatory fit in negotiations.

Specifically, I investigate how a match between negotiator role and regulatory focus can create a state of regulatory fit.

### Regulatory Fit in Price Negotiations

There are clear strategic commonalities between negotiator role and regulatory focus. In a price negotiation, the buyer role and a prevention focus share a preference for a vigilant, loss-minimization strategy whereas the seller role and a promotion focus share a preference for an eager, gain-maximization strategy. This suggests the possibility of regulatory fit, not between a goal orientation and its preferred strategy as in traditional regulatory fit (Higgins, 2000), but between two goal orientations with shared strategic preferences.

In price negotiations, the strategic complementarities between regulatory focus and negotiator role create *focus-role* fit. Prevention buyers and promotion sellers are in focus-role fit whereas prevention sellers and promotion buyers are in non-fit. Indeed Monga and Zhu (2005) found evidence that, in price negotiations, buyers relate to their goal pursuit in terms of non-losses and losses (i.e., in a prevention-related manner) and sellers relate to their goal pursuit in terms of gains and non-gains (i.e., in a promotion-related manner). I elaborate on these associations between regulatory focus and negotiator role by explicitly measuring the regulatory focus orientations of buyers and sellers. Whereas Monga and Zhu suggest that role induces regulatory focus, I hypothesize that both buyers and sellers can have a prevention focus or a promotion focus. Therefore, a match between role and chronic regulatory focus creates focus-role fit and a mismatch creates non-fit.

### The Present Research

The present research explores role in negotiation and is the first investigation of regulatory fit and non-fit in negotiation. The initial studies establish the focus-role fit phenomenon in price negotiations and the later studies explore its extensions. Studies 1 and 2 introduce focus-role fit in two price negotiations. Study 1 finds a focus-role fit effect on planned demand. Study 2 confirms the assumptions that negotiator role predicts negotiators' framing of the negotiation and that focus-role fit creates a subjective experience of fit. Study 2 additionally replicates focus-role fit effects on demand by looking at opening offers and impasse rates.

Studies 3 and 4 examine the mechanics of focus-role fit. Study 3 tests a moderator of focus-role fit. Low assessors in fit (vs. non-fit) report more positive preparatory responses, replicating the pattern of focus-role fit effects found in Studies 1 and 2. High assessors in fit (vs. non-fit), sensitive to the difference between *feeling* right and *doing* right, overcorrect their intensified responses and report less positive preparatory responses. This supports the contention that focus-role fit effects are due to the feeling right experience. Study 4 decomposes focus-role fit into its component pieces. Manipulating strategy creates focus-strategy fit and role-strategy fit and eliminates focus-role fit, providing evidence that focus-role fit is driven by the strategic commonalities between regulatory focus and negotiator role. Together Studies 3 and 4 clarify the workings of focus-role fit and set the stage for the final two studies.

Studies 5 and 6 employ negotiations emphasizing issues other than price. Study 5 uses a negotiation emphasizing information to look for a reversal in framing. When buyers have the goal of gaining information and sellers have the goal of not losing information, negotiator frames reverse such that buyers adopt a gain/non-gain frame and

sellers adopt a non-loss/loss frame. Study 6 explores the impact of role on negotiation more broadly, beyond single-issue negotiations between buyers and sellers. In the negotiation scenario used, there are two a priori equally important issues. For each role, one issue is about non-losses/losses and the other is about gains/non-gains. Study 6 finds that role and emphasized issue interact to impact negotiator frames, planned and actual demand, and negotiated outcomes. Together, these six studies demonstrate the importance of role in creating focus-role fit specifically and in impacting negotiation more generally. I end by considering the implications for focus-role fit and role.

## STUDY 1<sup>2</sup>

There is evidence that buyers view the negotiation in loss frames while sellers view the negotiation in gain frames (Carmon & Ariely, 2000; Monga & Zhu, 2005; Neale et al., 1987; Schei et al., 2006). However, no one has empirically tested the idea that, when the negotiation emphasizes price, the strategic commonality between having a prevention focus and performing the buyer role or between having a promotion focus and performing the seller role can create a state of regulatory fit. The present studies investigate implications of there being such a focus-role fit. In Study 1, I used a hypothetical, price negotiation to test whether, in preparing for an upcoming negotiation, there are higher levels of demand (more extreme prices) in focus-role fit conditions (prevention-buyer; promotion-seller) than in focus-role non-fit conditions (promotion-buyer; prevention-seller).

Demanding negotiators achieve better negotiated outcomes (Barry & Friedman, 1998; Donohue, 1981; Galinsky, Leonardelli, Okhuysen & Mussweiler, 2005; Galinsky

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<sup>2</sup>Data from Studies 1 and 2 are in press at *Social Cognition* (Appelt, Zou, Arora, & Higgins, in press). However, the presentation of the studies here is more comprehensive.



& Mussweiler, 2001; Galinsky, Mussweiler & Medvec, 2002; Huber & Neale, 1986, 1987; Van Poucke & Buelens, 2002; White & Neale, 1994). The purpose of Study 1 was to examine whether regulatory fit contributes to negotiators' demand as they prepare to negotiate. One conceptualization of demand is in terms of what negotiators feel is a fair or "right" price prior to the negotiation even beginning. This price is one that the negotiator feels would be a fair or right outcome. In a single-issue, one-shot negotiation, which is by default a distributive or zero-sum scenario, the natural response of negotiators should be one of demand. Because regulatory fit creates a feeling of rightness which intensifies responses (Higgins, 2000), negotiators in focus-role fit (prevention buyers and promotion sellers) should think more demanding prices are right than negotiators in non-fit (promotion buyers and prevention sellers).

I also investigated the possible impact of two other variables on negotiator demand: regulatory focus and reference price emphasis. Galinsky et al. (2005) found that promotion negotiators made more demanding opening offers than prevention negotiators, which is consistent with promotion negotiators wanting to advance a maximum price (ensure a gain) and prevention negotiators wanting at minimum to avoid an impasse (ensure a non-loss). Thus, I predicted that promotion negotiators would be more demanding than prevention negotiators.

Reference prices may also impact negotiator demand. Reference prices can serve as anchors, away from which negotiators modestly adjust (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). On the basis of previous research on the positive effects of higher negotiator goals (Blount et al., 1996; Galinsky et al., 2002; Huber & Neale, 1986, 1987; Van Poucke & Buelens, 2002; White & Neale, 1994), I hypothesized that negotiators who emphasized a

higher reference price (the aspiration price) would be more demanding in terms of what price they believed was right than negotiators who emphasized a less demanding reference price (the walk-away or reservation price). Finally, in line with Galinsky et al.'s (2005) finding that promotion negotiators reported paying more attention to their aspiration price than prevention negotiators, I also explored the possibility that a promotion focus combined with an aspiration emphasis, and perhaps a prevention focus combined with a reservation emphasis, would produce a regulatory fit that would increase demand.

In sum, I hypothesized that demand would have multiple sources: regulatory focus, reference price emphasis, and regulatory fit. Study 1 used a 2 (manipulated reference price emphasis: reservation price vs. aspiration price) x 2 (measured chronic regulatory focus: prevention vs. promotion) x 2 (assigned negotiator role: buyer vs. seller) between-participants design.

## Method

### *Participants*

One hundred five students participated in return for \$5 compensation or 1 experimental credit towards fulfillment of an introductory psychology course requirement. Twelve participants were excluded for not completing the study or for participation in an earlier study using the same scenario. The final participant count was 93 students (30 men, 61 women, and 2 participants who did not report gender). There were no effects of gender.

### *Procedure*

Participants arrived in response to flyers or were scheduled using an online sign-up system. Either two or four participants were run during each session to preserve the illusion that participants would be negotiating in dyads. Participants signed a consent form and were told we were running two short studies, a personality study and a negotiation study. Participants first completed “study 1,” which consisted of the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire.

The experimenter then explained that “study 2” was a negotiation study called “Synertech-Dosagen.” Participants were randomly assigned to pairs and to roles (buyer or seller). The experimenter passed out the case information and the pre-negotiation questionnaires, allowing participants fifteen minutes to read and prepare. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to a reservation price emphasis condition and the other half were assigned to an aspiration price emphasis condition, as described below.

When fifteen minutes had elapsed or all participants had completed the pre-questionnaire, the experimenter informed participants that the experiment had concluded and explained that the study was investigating pre-negotiation strategies. Participants were asked not to reveal this confidential information to other potential participants. Participants were then compensated, further debriefed, and thanked for their participation.

### *Materials*

#### *Regulatory Focus Questionnaire*

I measured participants’ chronic regulatory focus with the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (RFQ; Higgins et al., 2001). Higgins et al. designed the RFQ to obtain a subjective history of participants’ prevention success versus promotion success.

Achievement motivation theories suggest that individuals approach new tasks with the same strategies that have been previously successful for them. An individual with a subjective history of success with vigilant strategies is inclined to use vigilant strategies in new situations while an individual with a subjective history of success with eager strategies is inclined to use eager strategies (Higgins et al., 2001). The RFQ taps participants' subjective histories by asking eleven questions on five-point scales. Sample items include "Not being careful has gotten me into trouble at times" (prevention vigilance failure, reverse scored) and "How often have you accomplished things that got you 'psyched' to work even harder" (promotion eagerness success).

An individual who has experienced more success with vigilant strategies will have a higher prevention pride score, and an individual who has experienced more success with eager strategies will have a higher promotion pride score. The prevention pride and promotion pride scales tend to be correlated positively but only slightly so (in the current study:  $r(93) = .10, p = .3$ ), such that an individual can score high on neither, one, or both scales. The validity and reliability of the RFQ have been previously documented (Grant & Higgins, 2003; Higgins et al., 2001).

Participants' promotion pride and prevention pride were measured independently by the RFQ. To calculate participants' predominant chronic regulatory focus, I first subtracted the prevention pride score ( $M = 3.45, SD = 0.94, \text{Cronbach's } \alpha = .83$ ) from the promotion pride score ( $M = 3.83, SD = 0.58, \text{Cronbach's } \alpha = .65$ ). Participants whose difference scores were greater than zero were identified as chronically promotion focus (50 participants) and participants whose difference scores were less than or equal to zero

were identified as chronically prevention focus (43 participants). Analyses are based on this zero split on participants' difference scores.<sup>3</sup>

### *Case Information*

“Synertech-Dosagen” is a case commonly used in business school negotiation courses. The scenario was developed by Leonard Greenhalgh at the Amos Tuck School of Business Administration, Dartmouth College. Synertech and Dosagen are pharmaceutical firms. Dosagen is selling a bio-technology plant that Synertech would like to buy. Price is the main objective of both buyer and seller. The standard Synertech-Dosagen case was modified to excise extraneous information and to alter the reference prices to create an evenly-divisible \$10 million zone between the reservation price and the aspiration price (see Appendix A for the full case information).

*Reference price emphasis manipulation.* Buyers' and sellers' confidential information was adjusted to emphasize a single reference price. Case information was identical across the reservation price emphasis and aspiration price emphasis conditions except for the final two sentences, which asked participants to concentrate on meeting their reservation price or on attaining their aspiration price, respectively (see Appendix A for the full text of the manipulation).

### *Pre-negotiation Questionnaire*

Participants filled out the pre-negotiation questionnaire after reading the case information. The questionnaire asked participants to select the range of prices they considered fair or “right.” The range between participants' reservation price (\$27 million

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<sup>3</sup> Across studies, the zero split on the RFQ difference score is used to measure predominant orientation. Predominant orientation (relative orientation strength) determines preferred strategy, regardless of absolute orientation strength. Because, preferred strategy is the link between regulatory focus and role that creates focus-role fit, predominant orientation is the more important measure for focus-role fit.

for buyers and \$17 million for sellers) and aspiration price (\$17 million for buyers and \$27 million for sellers) was divided into 10 intervals of \$.9 million. Participants checked the appropriate interval(s) to indicate the prices they believed to be fair or right.

## Results

### *Calculating Average Price Selected as Right*

A negotiator can express demand by preferring an extreme price over an intermediate price. Thus, I calculated the average price selected as right to gauge participants' level of demand. Because buyers and sellers are on opposing sides of the negotiation, prices have different meanings for buyers versus sellers. A lower price is more demanding for buyers whereas a higher price is more demanding for sellers. To control for directional effects and to simplify interpretation, I intended to standardize average right price.

However, buyers and sellers have different estimates of fair prices (Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979; Weber & Kirsner, 1997). Asymmetric loss functions suggest that this is because misestimations have different consequences (Weber, 1994). In this case, overestimating (i.e., paying too much) is relatively costly for the buyer whereas underestimating (i.e., receiving too little) is relatively costly for the seller. Because the mean average right price differed between buyers and sellers, I standardized average right price by calculating, separately, the  $z$ -scores of the average right price for buyers and for sellers. I reversed the sign on the  $z$ -scores for the buyers. For the standardized variable, *higher values uniformly indicate a more demanding average right price* for all negotiators, whether buyers or sellers. The value of the variable reflects how demanding a negotiator's average right price is compared to other negotiators in that same role.

### *Standardized Average Price Selected as Right*

I conducted a three-way univariate analysis of variance—2 (reference price emphasis: reservation price vs. aspiration price) x 2 (chronic regulatory focus: prevention vs. promotion) x 2 (role: buyer vs. seller)—with standardized average right price as the dependent measure. Across studies, for brevity, I only report effects that reached at least a marginal level of significance. Effects not reported were not significant. Effects pertaining to my hypotheses are reported regardless of their level of significance.

A significant difference in demand was found for reference price emphasis,  $F(1, 85) = 4.09, p = .05$ . As predicted, negotiators in the aspiration price emphasis condition ( $M = 0.30, SD = 0.90$ ) were more demanding than negotiators in the reservation price emphasis condition ( $M = -0.34, SD = 0.99$ ). There was also a significant difference in demand as a function of regulatory focus,  $F(1, 85) = 5.52, p = .02$ . As predicted, chronically promotion negotiators ( $M = 0.13, SD = 0.99$ ) were more demanding than chronically prevention negotiators ( $M = -0.16, SD = 0.98$ ). The interaction of reference price emphasis and regulatory focus was not significant,  $p > .5$ .

Most important for the purpose of this study, the interaction of regulatory focus and negotiator role was significant,  $F(1, 85) = 10.26, p = .002$ . As predicted and as shown in Figure 1, prevention buyers ( $M = 0.21, SD = 0.90$ ) were more demanding than promotion buyers ( $M = -0.20, SD = 1.07$ ), whereas promotion sellers ( $M = 0.49, SD = 0.78$ ) were more demanding than prevention sellers ( $M = -0.62, SD = 0.91$ ). Planned contrast tests showed that the difference in means between prevention buyers and promotion buyers was a non-significant trend in the predicted direction,  $t(89) = 1.57, p =$

.12, and the difference in means between promotion sellers and prevention sellers was highly significant,  $t(89) = -3.95, p < .001$ .

## Discussion

The results of Study 1 supported the predicted regulatory focus by negotiator role fit effect on demand during negotiation preparation: prevention buyers and promotion sellers (focus-role fit) were more demanding than promotion buyers and prevention sellers (non-fit). The results were also consistent with the predicted greater demand of promotion negotiators than prevention negotiators as well as the predicted greater demand for an aspiration price emphasis than a reservation price emphasis.

Study 1 provided the first evidence that, in a negotiation about price, role interacts with regulatory focus to create focus-role fit. Negotiators in focus-role fit (prevention buyers and promotion sellers) were more demanding in their pricing when preparing for the negotiation than negotiators in non-fit (promotion buyers and prevention sellers). Because greater demand can translate to better outcomes (Barry & Friedman, 1998; Donohue, 1981; Galinsky et al., 2005; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Galinsky et al., 2002; Huber & Neale, 1986, 1987; Van Poucke & Buelens, 2002; White & Neale, 1994), these results are an important first step in exploring the effects of focus-role fit on negotiation. The Synertech-Dosagen negotiation case used in Study 1 has the advantage of being clearly about price. Its disadvantage is that it is a hypothetical scenario. For Study 2, I used a real negotiation with binding outcomes to further explore focus-role fit.

## STUDY 2

I designed Study 2 to be a real negotiation over a notebook with a Columbia University crest. Heeding the advice of Blount et al. (1996), I chose an object of



negotiation that would be familiar, credible, and simple. Hypothetical negotiation scenarios are practical for laboratory studies, but there are several advantages to using real negotiations. First, using a real negotiation with binding outcomes ensures that participants take the negotiation seriously and behave in line with their true preferences. Second, simplified scenarios eliminate most sources of confusion for undergraduate participants, who, like many people, have limited negotiation experience. They also use monetary amounts (e.g., \$1 to \$10 in Study 2 vs. \$17 million to \$27 million in Study 1) that are more familiar and meaningful to the average participant. Third, the streamlined negotiation can increase the emphasis on the desired issue. In the notebook negotiation used in Study 2, for example, because there is only one unalterable good to be negotiated, price is the only possible negotiable issue. Fourth, real negotiations with binding outcomes generalize more straightforwardly to real world negotiations. Therefore, using a real negotiation increases the external validity of my findings. For all of these reasons, I elected to use a real negotiation with binding outcomes for Study 2.

Study 2 additionally improved upon Study 1 by testing two of the assumptions of the focus-role fit model. New measures were added to the pre-negotiation questionnaire to assess whether buyers and sellers approached the negotiation with different frames. As discussed earlier, frame was not a manipulated variable. Rather, participants' own definition of the negotiation as a non-loss/loss situation or a gain/non-gain situation was measured. I expected to find direct evidence for the claim that buyers approach the negotiation as a non-loss/loss situation whereas sellers approach the negotiation as a gain/non-gain situation (Carmon & Ariely, 2000; Monga & Zhu, 2005; Neale et al., 1987). I also added measures to assess whether negotiators in the focus-role fit conditions

(prevention-buyer; promotion-seller) had a subjective experience of fit with their randomly assigned roles, as compared to negotiators in the non-fit conditions (promotion-buyer; prevention-seller).

Study 2 further extended my investigation of focus-role fit by moving beyond negotiation preparation measures to look at negotiation processes and outcomes. In Study 2, participants negotiated in dyads. In a post-negotiation questionnaire, they provided data on their opening offers as well as their outcomes. Opening offers play an important role in negotiations and are highly predictive of the final negotiated agreement amount (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Building upon Study 1's findings of increased preparatory demand from negotiators in focus-role fit versus negotiators in non-fit, I expected negotiators in focus-role fit to open with more demanding offers than negotiators in non-fit.

I also expected differences in demand to impact outcomes in two ways: impasse frequency and agreement amount. I expected dyads with *both* members in focus-role fit to reach impasses more often than other dyads. When both members of a dyad are demanding, an agreement is less likely than if just one member of a dyad is demanding. Lastly, I expected negotiators in focus-role fit to outperform non-fit negotiators. Study 2 used a 2 (measured chronic regulatory focus: prevention vs. promotion) x 2 (assigned negotiator role: buyer vs. seller) between-participants design.

## Method

### *Participants*

One hundred twelve students participated in return for \$8 compensation or 2 experimental credits. Ten participants were excluded from all analyses because they had

participated in an earlier version of this study or did not follow instructions. For the individual-level analyses, there were 102 participants (56 women and 46 men). Data from an additional 8 participants was excluded from post-negotiation analyses: 4 were paired with excluded participants and 4 did not complete the study. For dyadic-level analyses, there were 94 participants (49 women and 45 men) or 47 dyads. There were no effects of gender.

### *Procedure*

Participants arrived in response to flyers or were scheduled using an online sign-up system. In order to form negotiation dyads, either two or four participants were run during each session. Participants signed a consent form and were told that we were running two short studies, a personality study and a negotiation study. Participants first completed “study 1,” which consisted of the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire and the Regulatory Mode Questionnaire, which I will discuss in Study 3.

The experimenter then explained that “study 2” was a negotiation study. Participants were randomly assigned to pairs and to roles (buyer or seller), and were told that they would be negotiating over a notebook with a university crest. Sellers were given a Columbia University notebook and buyers were given \$5 in singles. The experimenter explained that the negotiated outcome, whether impasse or agreement, would be binding and separate from compensation for participation. Outcomes were restricted to range between \$0 and \$10. Any agreement over \$5 would require additional money from the buyer above and beyond the \$5 endowment. (Only one agreement was reached for an amount above \$5, and this was for \$5.75.)

Participants were allowed 15 minutes to complete a pre-negotiation questionnaire and prepare for the negotiation. Participants were then paired with their randomly assigned partner and given 15 minutes to negotiate. The experimenter oversaw the enactment of the negotiated outcome, whether impasse or agreement. Participants completed a final post-negotiation questionnaire before being compensated (in addition to whatever outcome they had negotiated), debriefed, and thanked.

### *Materials*

#### *Regulatory Focus Questionnaire*

I again measured participants' chronic regulatory focus with the RFQ (Higgins et al., 2001). In this study, promotion pride and prevention pride scores were uncorrelated,  $r(102) = .10, p = .3$ . To calculate participants' predominant chronic regulatory focus, I first subtracted the prevention pride score ( $M = 3.39, SD = 0.85, \text{Cronbach's } \alpha = .83$ ) from the promotion pride score ( $M = 3.84, SD = 0.48, \text{Cronbach's } \alpha = .69$ ). Participants whose difference scores were greater than zero were identified as chronically promotion focus (65 participants) and participants whose difference scores were less than or equal to zero were identified as chronically prevention focus (37 participants). Analyses are based on this zero split on participants' difference scores.

#### *Case Information*

The buyer was given \$5 whereas the seller was given a notebook bearing a Columbia University crest, an item which was pre-tested for desirability. The actual price of the notebook (\$3.98) was not revealed to either party. The experimenter stressed that the negotiation was real and the negotiated outcome would be binding. Neither buyers nor sellers received any additional role information.

### *Pre-negotiation Questionnaire*

Participants filled out the pre-negotiation questionnaire after receiving their role materials (\$5 for the buyer and the notebook for the seller). The questionnaire was comprised of a battery of measures designed to assess participants' pre-negotiation attitudes and strategies.

*Negotiator frame.* Four questions assessed how participants construed the upcoming negotiation. Again, in contrast to previous work on frame in negotiation (Bazerman et al., 1985; De Dreu et al., 1994; De Dreu & McCusker, 1997; Neale & Bazerman, 1985; Sondak et al., 1995), in the present studies, negotiator frames were measured rather than manipulated. Participants were asked to rate the extent (1 = *absolutely not* to 7 = *absolutely yes*) to which they viewed the negotiation as a chance to create value, to minimize loss, to attain resources, and to maintain resources.

*Experienced role fit.* Three questions assessed participants' experience of fit or non-fit with their randomly assigned role. Participants were asked to rate to what extent (1 = *absolutely not* to 7 = *absolutely yes*) their roles felt like a good fit, were engaging, and felt right.

### *Post-negotiation Questionnaire*

Participants individually completed the post-negotiation questionnaire at the conclusion of their negotiation. The questionnaire asked participants to record information about opening offers (i.e., who opened the negotiation and at what price) and negotiated outcomes (i.e., was the outcome an impasse or agreement, what were the final offers or agreement amount).

## Results

I conducted a series of 2 (chronic regulatory focus: prevention vs. promotion) x 2 (role: buyer vs. seller) univariate analyses of variance to assess how participants approached the negotiation.

#### *Negotiator Frame*

The ratings of minimize loss and maintain resources ( $r(102) = .43, p < .001$ ) were averaged to create a measure of *non-loss/loss framing*. As predicted, role was a significant predictor of non-loss/loss frame,  $F(1, 98) = 8.44, p = .005$ . Buyers ( $M = 4.39, SD = 1.35$ ) approached the negotiation using non-loss/loss frames more than sellers ( $M = 3.73, SD = 1.12$ ), as shown in Figure 2a.

Similarly, the ratings of create value and attain resources ( $r(102) = .52, p < .001$ ) were averaged to create a measure of *gain/non-gain framing*. As predicted, role was a significant predictor of gain/non-gain frame,  $F(1, 98) = 4.79, p = .03$ . Sellers ( $M = 4.96, SD = 1.15$ ) approached the negotiation using gain/non-gain frames more than buyers ( $M = 4.34, SD = 1.30$ ), as shown in Figure 2b.

#### *Experienced Role Fit*

Because the three measures assessing participants' feelings about their assigned role (role fit, engagement, and rightness) were highly intercorrelated (Cronbach's  $\alpha = .86$ ), I averaged them to create a measure of participants' subjective experience of role fit, or *experienced role fit*. Buyers ( $M = 4.71, SD = 1.19$ ) reported experiencing greater fit than sellers ( $M = 4.33, SD = 1.21$ ),  $F(1, 98) = 4.68, p = .03$ . This may reflect greater comfort with the buyer role, perhaps due to its relative familiarity (i.e., as consumers, people are more frequently buyers than sellers).

More importantly and as predicted, the interaction of regulatory focus and role was significant,  $F(1, 98) = 5.55, p = .02$ . As shown in Figure 3, prevention buyers ( $M = 5.07, SD = 1.24$ ) reported experiencing greater fit than promotion buyers ( $M = 4.55, SD = 1.15$ ), whereas promotion sellers ( $M = 4.60, SD = 1.07$ ) reported experiencing greater fit than prevention sellers ( $M = 3.95, SD = 1.31$ ). Planned contrast tests showed that, while the difference in means between prevention buyers and promotion buyers was non-significant in the predicted direction,  $t(98) = 1.41, p > .15$ , the difference in means between promotion sellers and prevention sellers was significant,  $t(98) = -1.95, p = .05$ .

#### *Opening Offer*

Forty-three dyads provided usable (consistent between the two members of the dyad) data on the opening offer made in their negotiation. To explore the effect of focus-role fit on opening offer demand, I looked at the subset of negotiators who opened their negotiation (the openers). I standardized opening offer following the procedures outlined in Study 1—I separately calculated the z-scores for buyers and sellers and reversed the sign for buyers. Therefore, *higher values indicate a more demanding opening offer* than others in the same role.

As expected, the interaction of regulatory focus and role was significant,  $F(1, 39) = 4.71, p = .04$ . As shown in Figure 4, prevention buyers ( $M = 0.67, SD = 0.99$ ) were more demanding than promotion buyers ( $M = -0.23, SD = 0.94$ ), whereas promotion sellers ( $M = 0.23, SD = 0.94$ ) were more demanding than prevention sellers ( $M = -0.33, SD = 1.03$ ). Planned contrast tests showed that the difference in means was a non-significant trend in the predicted direction for buyers,  $t(39) = 1.61, p = .11$ , and for sellers,  $t(39) = -1.49, p = .15$ .

### *Frequency of Impasse*

To look at outcome measures, I used dyads rather than individual negotiators as the unit of analysis. Forty-seven dyads negotiated to an outcome; of these, 14 (30%)<sup>4</sup> reached an impasse. The outcome type variable was contrast coded (agreement = -1; impasse = +1). Because my prediction was that dyads with both members in focus-role fit would be more likely to impasse than other dyads, I created a dyad composition variable using a contrast code: -1 for dyads with zero or one member in focus-role fit and +1 for dyads with both members in focus-role fit. I then ran a binary logistic regression with outcome type as the dependent variable and dyad composition as the independent variable. Dyad composition was a marginally significant predictor of outcome type,  $B = 1.39$ ,  $SE = 0.77$ , Wald's  $\chi^2 (1, N = 47) = 3.26$ ,  $p = .07$ . An impasse was reached by only 23.7% of dyads with 0 or 1 member in fit, but by 55.6% of dyads with *both* members in fit—more than twice as many.

### *Agreement Amount*

In their negotiations over the notebooks, 33 dyads reached an agreement ( $M = \$3.23$ ,  $SD = \$1.00$ , range = \$2.00 – \$5.75). To test whether fit negotiators (prevention buyers and promotion sellers) outperformed non-fit negotiators (promotion buyers and prevention sellers), I conducted a 2 (buyer chronic regulatory focus: prevention vs. promotion) x 2 (seller chronic regulatory focus: prevention vs. promotion) univariate analysis of variance. Neither buyer regulatory focus nor seller regulatory focus was significant,  $ps > .2$ . I will explore possible reasons for this in the Discussion.

### Discussion

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<sup>4</sup> Across the studies presented here, the percent of dyads reaching impasse averaged 29%.



The results of Study 2 provided further support for focus-role fit. Buyers and sellers adopted different frames of the price negotiation. Buyers approached the negotiation in terms of non-losses and losses whereas sellers approached the negotiation in terms of gains and non-gains. Negotiators whose chronic regulatory focus matched their assigned role (prevention buyers and promotion sellers), and were thus in focus-role fit, experienced a greater feeling of fit with their randomly assigned roles. Negotiators in focus-role fit who opened had more demanding opening offers than negotiators in non-fit. In line with the increased demand of negotiators in focus-role fit, dyads with *both* members in fit were more likely to impasse than dyads with one or both members in non-fit.

Study 2 did not find an effect on agreement amount. This may be due in part to the narrow range of outcomes and to the small size of the sample for dyadic analyses (33 dyads who reached an agreement). In addition, I used a zero split on the difference score from the RFQ to determine chronic regulatory focus. A quartile split, which identifies high prevention focus (lower 25%) and high promotion focus (upper 25%), would enable a stronger comparison of negotiators with the two regulatory orientations, but this would necessitate a much larger sample size in order to have enough observations for each cell. I will return to this issue in the General Discussion.

Nonetheless, Study 2 provided strong evidence for regulatory fit from a match between chronic regulatory focus and negotiator role. In a price negotiation, buyers and sellers adopted different frames of the negotiation. These frames matched with different regulatory focus orientations. Prevention buyers and promotion sellers (fit) experienced a better fit with their assigned roles and opened with more demanding offers than

promotion buyers and prevention sellers (non-fit). Finally, when two negotiators in focus-role fit negotiated, they were more likely to reach an impasse than any other pairing. Across two different negotiations, Studies 1 and 2 found evidence for focus-role fit as a match between chronic regulatory focus and assigned role. Fit created a feeling of rightness, increased demand, and impacted outcomes.

#### Summary of Studies 1 and 2

Studies 1 and 2 introduced focus-role fit using two different price negotiations. Study 1 found an effect of focus-role fit on preparatory demand using a hypothetical price negotiation. Prevention buyers and promotion sellers (fit) preferred a more demanding price than promotion buyers and prevention sellers (non-fit). Study 2 used a real price negotiation to confirm that buyers and sellers approach a price negotiation with different frames (non-loss/loss and gain/non-gain, respectively). Study 2 additionally found that prevention buyers and promotion sellers (fit) experienced a greater fit with their negotiator role and opened with more demanding offers than promotion buyers and prevention sellers (non-fit). Moreover, dyads with both negotiators in fit were more likely to impasse than other dyads.

Studies 1 and 2 established the basic phenomenon of focus-role fit in price negotiations. The next studies build upon this foundation and ascertain how focus-role fit operates in price negotiations. Study 3 investigates *how* focus-role fit affects negotiator responses. Testing a moderator of focus-role fit yields evidence that focus-role fit effects on negotiator responses are due to the feeling right experience that regulatory fit creates. Study 4 examines why matches between regulatory focus and negotiator role create

focus-role fit. Manipulating strategy confirms my hypothesis that fit is due to the strategic commonalities between regulatory focus and negotiator role.

### STUDY 3

After establishing the basic phenomenon of focus-role fit, I wanted to determine how fit operates. Higgins (2000) posited that regulatory fit creates a feeling of rightness about goal approach and that regulatory fit intensifies responses through this accompanying feeling of rightness. To test whether focus-role fit impacts negotiator responses through the experience of feeling right, I looked for a moderator of focus-role fit effects. As a candidate, I chose an assessment orientation because of its deep concern with *doing* right versus *feeling* right. Study 3 tested whether low assessors in fit (vs. non-fit) would replicate the previous pattern of fit effects and report intensified responses whereas high assessors in fit (vs. non-fit) would attempt to correct their intensified responses and, in so doing, either eliminate or reverse focus-role fit effects. This would support the contention that focus-role fit influences responses *through the experience of feeling right*.

#### *Assessment Orientation*

Self-regulation requires two functions: an *assessment* function that makes comparisons (e.g., between the current state and the goal state, between different goal states, between different goal strategies) and a *locomotion* function that moves from state to state (Higgins, Kruglanski, & Pierro, 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000). Regulatory mode theory (Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000) extends classic self-regulation theories (e.g., Gollwitzer & Brandstatter, 1990; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987; Kuhl, 1985; Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, & Sears, 1944; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960) by

viewing the two processes or functions of discrepancy assessment and discrepancy reduction as general and independent concerns that can be differentially emphasized across individuals, as seen with chronic individual differences (e.g., Kruglanski et al., 2000), and across situations, as seen with momentary context inductions (e.g., Avnet & Higgins, 2003). As chronic individual differences, assessment concerns and locomotion concerns are relatively independent, such that individuals may be high on neither, one, or both orientations (see Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000). Importantly, regulatory mode is conceptually orthogonal to regulatory focus. Regulatory mode describes a relative emphasis on comparison and critical evaluation (assessment) versus initiating and maintaining movement (locomotion), whereas regulatory focus describes a relative emphasis on non-losses/losses (prevention) versus gains/non-gains (promotion).

Locomotion is concerned with the initiation and maintenance of movement. For high locomotors, movement is an end in itself (Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000; Pierro, Kruglanski, & Higgins, 2006b). A locomotion orientation is epitomized by the slogan, “just do it!” Assessment, on the other hand, is “the comparative aspect of self-regulation concerned with critically evaluating entities or states, such as goals or means, in relation to alternatives in order to judge relative quality” (Higgins et al., 2003, p. 297). Assessors want to evaluate all options and “do the right thing” (Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000). Although each orientation motivates different preferences and behaviors (e.g., Benjamin & Flynn, 2006; Kruglanski, Pierro, & Higgins, 2007), both assessment and locomotion are necessary for self-regulatory success (Kruglanski et al., 2000; Pierro, Kruglanski, & Higgins, 2006a).

While assessment motivates critical evaluation and comparison, high assessors can be driven beyond normal levels of these behaviors to hypercriticism and excessive comparison (Kruglanski et al., 2000; Kumashiro, Rusbult, Finkenauer, & Stocker, 2007; Pierro et al., 2008). High assessors' insistence on doing the right thing can be excessive as well. They want to do right even if it makes them feel wrong, as indicated by a willingness to suffer negative affect from critical self-evaluations in order to be right (Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000). Might this insistence on *doing* right lead high assessors to correct biases from *feeling* right, and even to overcorrect? Before we address this question, let us consider what it means to correct and overcorrect.

#### *Correction and Overcorrection*

An attempt to correct a perceived bias can lead to an *overcorrection*, where the original effect is not just eliminated but reversed (Martin, 1986; Wegener & Petty, 1995, 1997). In particular, Wegener & Petty's (1995, 1997) Flexible Correction Model posits that people may identify a perceived bias and respond to it using a naïve theory of bias. Because people often misjudge the extent, the direction, or even the existence of a bias, they may inaccurately adjust, resulting in overcorrection, undercorrection, exacerbation or even bias creation. Overcorrection is a common mistake in domains ranging from priming to persuasion to impression formation (Wegener & Petty, 1995, 1997).

However, attempts at correction are anticipated only when individuals are motivated (Martin, 1986; Schwarz & Bless, 1992a, 1992b; Wegener & Petty, 1995, 1997). High assessors are naturally motivated to critically evaluate their responses as well as to be accurate and do the right thing (Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000). Consequently, an assessment orientation may be a source of a strong motivation to exert

the extra cognitive effort to both identify perceived biases and attempt to correct them, even when these biases are from a relevant and appropriate source—integral regulatory fit. In other words, the biases are the result of feeling right *about* their negotiation preparation, and not the result of an irrelevant source or incidental regulatory fit from a prior task (see Cesario et al., 2007). However, feeling right is not the same thing as doing right. Feeling right, even though appropriate, might be perceived as a *bias* that inflates responses. With their heightened concern with doing right, high assessors may be sensitive to perceived biases and attempt to correct them. In so doing, they may produce not only an elimination of the perceived biases but even a reversal. An elimination or reversal of focus-role fit effects for high assessors would suggest that fit does indeed operate through the experience of feeling right.

### *Hypotheses*

Study 3 used a real price negotiation with binding outcomes. I investigated the *pre-negotiation planning stage*, which emphasizes evaluating and comparing alternatives and is thus where the effects of an assessment orientation should be especially strong. Participants rated their pre-negotiation affective state, anticipated performance, and perceived assessment competence.

Across all measures, I expected main effects of assessment and locomotion. Because high assessors evaluate their positions extensively, they should be more aware of both the pros *and* the cons of any evaluation target. Kruglanski et al. (2000) suggested that this awareness is the source of high assessors' greater negative affect and lower optimism. Therefore, I expected high (vs. low) assessors to have lower ratings of their affective state, anticipated performance, and perceived assessment competence. High

locomotors have positive expectancies (Kruglanski et al., 2000; Kruglanski, Pierro, Higgins, & Capozza, 2007), which may serve as a tactical ploy—using confidence and self-esteem to help propel movement (see Higgins, 2008; Higgins, Pierro, & Kruglanski, in press). At the same time, high locomotors derive positive affect, optimism and self-esteem from their sense of progress (Kruglanski et al., 2000). Hence, I expected high (vs. low) locomotors to have higher ratings of their affective state, anticipated performance, and perceived assessment competence.

My main hypothesis was that focus-role fit would be moderated by assessment. Across all measures, I predicted that low assessors would show the established patterns of focus-role fit effects for price negotiations. Assuming negotiators generally respond positively to their situation—experience positive affective states, anticipate good performances, and perceive themselves as able to assess their positions, the intensification of responses in focus-role fit should lead prevention buyers and promotion sellers (fit) to respond more positively than promotion buyers and prevention sellers (non-fit). I did not expect these effects to be replicated for high assessors, however. Instead, I predicted that the strong motivation of high assessors to critically evaluate, to *do* right rather than just *feel* right, would make them suspicious of feeling right from regulatory fit. Correcting the bias from feeling right in order to do right could simply eliminate the fit effect, but, if the correction was strong enough, it could reverse the fit effect—a classic implicit overcorrection effect (Wegener & Petty, 1995, 1997). This would produce a reversal such that fit negotiators (prevention buyers and promotion sellers) respond *less* positively than non-fit negotiators (promotion buyers and prevention

sellers). Because locomotion is not related to critical evaluation or a concern with doing right, I did not expect locomotion to moderate focus-role fit.

Study 3 used a 2 (measured chronic regulatory focus: prevention vs. promotion) x 2 (assigned negotiator role: buyer vs. seller) between-participants design with assessment orientation and locomotion orientation included as covariates.

### Method

#### *Participants*

Study 3 used the same 102 participants (56 women and 46 men) participants as Study 2. There were no effects of gender.

#### *Procedure*

Participants followed the procedure described in Study 2. Participants filled out the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire and the Regulatory Mode Questionnaire as part of “study 1” and then participated in the real, binding notebook negotiation for “study 2.” Although participants carried out the negotiation, the focus of my hypotheses for this study concerned participants’ evaluative judgments during pre-negotiation preparation.

#### *Materials*

##### *Regulatory Focus Questionnaire*

I again analyzed participants’ chronic regulatory focus using the zero split on the difference score. As in Study 2, there were 65 chronically promotion-focused participants and 37 chronically prevention-focused participants.

##### *Regulatory Mode Questionnaire*

I measured participants’ chronic regulatory mode with the Regulatory Mode Questionnaire (RMQ; Kruglanski et al., 2000), which consists of 30 items using six-point



scales. Sample items include “I often compare myself with other people” (assessment) and “When I finish one project, I often wait awhile before getting started on a new one” (locomotion, reverse scored). Previous studies (see Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000) have found that assessment and locomotion orientations are orthogonal or uncorrelated. This was also the case in the current study:  $r(102) = -.07, p = .5$ . The validity and reliability of the RMQ have been previously documented (Kruglanski et al., 2000).

I separately calculated participants’ assessment orientation scores ( $M = 4.06, SD = 0.68, \text{Cronbach’s } \alpha = .79$ ) and locomotion orientation scores ( $M = 4.31, SD = 0.59, \text{Cronbach’s } \alpha = .76$ ). All analyses, except where specifically noted, use these two continuous measures, for each of which a higher score indicates a stronger orientation. Neither assessment nor locomotion was significantly correlated with predominant regulatory focus ( $r(102) = -.02, p = .9$  and  $r(102) = .12, p = .2$ , respectively).

#### *Case Information*

The case information was as described in Study 2. The buyer was given \$5 whereas the seller was given a notebook bearing a Columbia University crest.

#### *Pre-negotiation Questionnaire*

Participants filled out the pre-negotiation questionnaire described in Study 2. The questionnaire was comprised of a battery of measures designed to assess participants’ pre-negotiation attitudes and strategies. For Study 3, I analyzed a different sub-set of the questions participants answered. Participants rated their current state-of-mind (1 = *very negative* to 7 = *very positive*), their current mood (1 = *very bad* to 7 = *very good*), the strength of their pre-negotiation position (1 = *very weak* to 7 = *very strong*), and how well

they expected to perform (1 = *very poorly* to 7 = *very well*). Participants also rated how confident (1 = *absolutely not* to 7 = *absolutely yes*) they felt in their prospective assessments of how well they would perform. Lastly, participants rated how easy (1 = *extremely difficult* to 7 = *extremely easy*) it would be to assess their performance once the negotiation had concluded.

## Results

To test whether an assessment orientation moderated focus-role fit, I conducted a series of linear regressions. I used standardized assessment and locomotion scores to reduce multicollinearity. I included the following predictors: role (contrast coded: buyer = -1; seller = +1), predominant regulatory focus (contrast coded: prevention = -1; promotion = +1), locomotion, assessment, Regulatory Focus x Role, Regulatory Focus x Assessment, Role x Assessment, and Regulatory Focus x Role x Assessment.<sup>5</sup>

### *Affective State*

I combined the state of mind and mood measures ( $r(101) = .71, p < .001$ ) into an *affective state* variable. Assessment and locomotion had significant main effects on affective state,  $B = -0.26, SE = 0.11, t(92) = -2.39, p = .02$  and  $B = 0.28, SE = 0.10, t(92) = 2.70, p = .008$ , respectively. Consistent with previous findings relating regulatory mode to affective states (see Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000), higher assessors felt less positive than lower assessors whereas higher locomotors felt more positive than lower locomotors. The interaction of regulatory focus and role was non-significant,  $p > .2$ . Most importantly for the purpose of the study, the predicted three-way interaction

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<sup>5</sup>The interactions with locomotion (Regulatory Focus x Locomotion, Role x Locomotion, and Regulatory Focus x Role x Locomotion) did not produce consistently significant results. The three-way interaction was notably non-significant indicating that, as predicted, locomotion did not moderate focus-role fit. Moreover, the locomotion interactions did not change the pattern of results and were thus excluded.

between regulatory focus, role, and assessment was marginally significant,  $B = -0.21$ ,  $SE = 0.11$ ,  $t(92) = -1.93$ ,  $p = .06$ .

To clarify the nature of this three-way interaction, I performed a median split on assessment score and separately conducted two-way linear regression analyses for low assessors and high assessors. Among low assessors, the interaction between regulatory focus and negotiator role was highly significant,  $B = 0.39$ ,  $SE = 0.14$ ,  $t(51) = 2.81$ ,  $p = .007$ . As predicted and as shown in Figure 5a, low assessors demonstrated the established pattern of focus-role fit effects with prevention buyers and promotion sellers (focus-role fit) having more positive affect than promotion buyers and prevention sellers (non-fit). Planned contrasts confirmed that low assessors in fit had significantly more positive affect than low assessors in non-fit,  $t(53) = 2.95$ ,  $p = .005$ .

Among high assessors, on the other hand, the interaction between regulatory focus and negotiator role was marginally significant in the *opposite* direction,  $B = -0.27$ ,  $SE = .15$ ,  $t(42) = -1.74$ ,  $p = .09$ . High assessors, as predicted and as shown in Figure 5b, showed a pattern *opposite* to the established focus-role fit pattern. Prevention buyers and promotion sellers (fit) expressed *less* positive affect than promotion buyers and prevention sellers (non-fit). Planned contrasts confirmed that high assessors in fit had marginally significantly *less* positive affect than high assessors in non-fit,  $t(44) = 1.97$ ,  $p = .06$ .

### *Anticipated Performance*

Next I combined the perceived strength and expected performance measures ( $r(102) = .49$ ,  $p < .001$ ) into an *anticipated performance* variable. There was an unexpected significant main effect of role,  $B = -0.60$ ,  $SD = 0.09$ ,  $t(93) = -6.42$ ,  $p < .001$ .

Sellers anticipated worse performances than buyers. Assessment and locomotion again had significant main effects,  $B = -0.26$ ,  $SE = 0.09$ ,  $t(93) = -2.75$ ,  $p = .007$  and  $B = 0.28$ ,  $SE = 0.09$ ,  $t(93) = 3.06$ ,  $p = .003$ , respectively. Consistent with previous findings relating regulatory mode to optimism (see Kruglanski et al., 2000), higher assessors anticipated worse performances than lower assessors, whereas higher locomotors anticipated better performances than lower locomotors. The interaction of regulatory focus and role was not significant,  $p > .15$ . Most importantly, and as predicted, the three-way interaction between regulatory focus, role, and assessment was highly significant,  $B = -0.27$ ,  $SE = 0.09$ ,  $t(93) = -2.84$ ,  $p = .006$ .

I again clarified the nature of the three-way interaction with separate two-way regressions for low and high assessors. Among low assessors, the interaction between regulatory focus and negotiator role was highly significant,  $B = 0.39$ ,  $SE = 0.12$ ,  $t(52) = 3.18$ ,  $p = .002$ . As predicted, and as shown in Figure 6a, low assessors demonstrated the established pattern of focus-role fit effects with prevention buyers and promotion sellers (fit) anticipating better performances than promotion buyers and prevention sellers (non-fit). Planned contrasts confirmed that low assessors in fit anticipated marginally significantly better performances than low assessors in non-fit,  $t(54) = 1.75$ ,  $p = .09$ .

Among high assessors, the interaction between regulatory focus and negotiator role was marginally significant in the *opposite* direction,  $B = -0.26$ ,  $SE = .14$ ,  $t(42) = -1.88$ ,  $p = .07$ . For high assessors, as shown in Figure 6b, prevention buyers and promotion sellers (fit) anticipated *worse* performances than promotion buyers and prevention sellers (non-fit). Planned contrasts confirmed that high assessors in fit

anticipated significantly *worse* performances than high assessors in non-fit,  $t(44) = 2.37$ ,  $p = .02$ .

### *Perceived Assessment Competence*

For my third regression, I combined the measures of confidence in prospective assessment and forecasted ease of retrospective assessment ( $r(102) = .37$ ,  $p < .001$ ) into a *perceived assessment competence* variable. There were effects of assessment and locomotion in opposite directions,  $B = -0.18$ ,  $SE = 0.09$ ,  $t(93) = -1.95$ ,  $p = .05$  and  $B = 0.16$ ,  $SE = 0.09$ ,  $t(93) = 1.82$ ,  $p = .07$ , respectively. Higher assessors perceived their assessment competence to be lower than lower assessors, and higher locomotors perceived their assessment competence to be higher than lower locomotors. These results are generally consistent with previous findings that high locomotors have high confidence in their judgment whereas high assessors are uncertain and lack confidence unless they have complete information, something they could not have for the upcoming negotiation (see Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000). The interaction of regulatory focus and role was non-significant,  $p > .2$ . Most importantly, and again as predicted, the three-way interaction between regulatory focus, role, and assessment was highly significant,  $B = -0.29$ ,  $SE = 0.09$ ,  $t(93) = -3.07$ ,  $p = .003$ .

As before, I clarified the pattern of results by conducting separate two-way regressions for low and high assessors. Among low assessors, the interaction between regulatory focus and negotiator role was significant,  $B = 0.32$ ,  $SE = 0.12$ ,  $t(52) = 2.67$ ,  $p = .01$ . As predicted, and as shown in Figure 7a, low assessors once again demonstrated the established pattern of focus-role fit effects; prevention buyers and promotion sellers (fit) perceived their assessment competence to be higher than promotion buyers and

prevention sellers (non-fit). Planned contrasts confirmed that low assessors in fit perceived their assessment competence to be significantly higher than low assessors in non-fit,  $t(54) = 2.76, p = .008$ .

Among high assessors, the interaction between regulatory focus and negotiator role was once again significant in the *opposite* direction,  $B = -0.29, SE = .13, t(42) = -2.19, p = .03$ . For high assessors, as shown in Figure 7b, prevention buyers and promotions sellers (fit) perceived their assessment competence to be *lower* than promotion buyers and prevention sellers (non-fit). Planned contrasts confirmed that high assessors in fit perceived their assessment competence to be significantly *lower* than high assessors in non-fit,  $t(44) = 2.06, p = .05$ .

#### *Overall Position Evaluation*

Lastly, I performed the same regression using a dependent variable combining all six negotiation preparation measures into an *overall position evaluation* variable (Cronbach's  $\alpha = .82$ ). The same general pattern of results was obtained. There was a significant main effect of role,  $B = -0.23, SD = 0.08, t(92) = -2.91, p = .005$ , such that sellers evaluated their position less positively than buyers. There were also significant main effects of assessment and locomotion,  $B = -0.23, SE = 0.08, t(92) = -2.77, p = .007$  and  $B = 0.25, SE = 0.08, t(92) = 3.12, p = .002$ , respectively. Consistent with previous research (Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000), higher assessors evaluated their position less positively than lower assessors, and higher locomotors evaluated their position more positively than lower locomotors. The interaction of regulatory focus and role was non-significant,  $p > .15$ . Most importantly, and as predicted, the three-way

interaction between regulatory focus, role, and assessment was highly significant,  $B = -0.25$ ,  $SE = 0.08$ ,  $t(92) = -3.03$ ,  $p = .003$ .

I again clarified the pattern of results with separate two-way regressions for low and high assessors. As predicted, among low assessors, there was a highly significant interaction between regulatory focus and negotiator role,  $B = 0.36$ ,  $SE = 0.11$ ,  $t(51) = 3.33$ ,  $p = .002$ , which, as shown in Figure 8a, reflected the established focus-role fit pattern of prevention buyers and promotion sellers (fit) evaluating their position more positively than promotion buyers and prevention sellers (non-fit). Planned contrasts confirmed that low assessors in fit evaluated their position significantly more positively than low assessors in non-fit,  $t(53) = 2.89$ ,  $p = .005$ .

Among high assessors, as predicted, there was a significant interaction in the *opposite* direction,  $B = -0.27$ ,  $SE = 0.11$ ,  $t(42) = -2.46$ ,  $p = .02$ . As shown in Figure 8b, prevention buyers and promotion sellers (fit) evaluated their position *less* positively than promotion buyers and prevention sellers (non-fit). Planned contrasts confirmed that high assessors in fit evaluated their position significantly *less* positively than high assessors in non-fit,  $t(44) = 2.79$ ,  $p = .008$ .

### Discussion

The overall results of Study 3 replicated past findings (see Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000). High (vs. low) assessors consistently reported lower evaluations of their pre-negotiation positions—less positive affect, worse anticipated performance, and lower perceived assessment competence. Because they compare their position against various standards of comparison (e.g., their ideal position, their past positions, their counterpart's assumed position), high assessors are aware of both their strengths and

weaknesses; this variety of self-generated feedback causes high assessors to have a less positive outlook (Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000). In contrast, high (vs. low) locomotors consistently reported higher evaluations of their pre-negotiation positions—more positive affect, better anticipated performance, and higher perceived assessment competence. Replicating past findings (Kruglanski et al., 2000), high locomotors were more optimistic and confident, perhaps reflecting a pre-negotiation preparatory tactic to help initiate action in the negotiation.

There was an unexpected main effect of role for anticipated performance (and for overall position evaluation); sellers expected lower performances (and evaluated their position less positively) than buyers. This may reflect participants' greater experience, as consumers, with buying versus selling. Alternatively, it may be a context-specific result due to the greater perceived versatility or usefulness of the buyer's money versus the seller's notebook. Because money can be used for many purposes whereas the notebook has limited uses, the money may be seen as a greater source of power in the negotiation. Either explanation is also consistent with the results of Study 2 indicating that buyers experienced greater fit with their role than sellers.

Most importantly for the objective of the study, across all analyses the predicted three-way interaction between chronic predominant regulatory focus, assigned negotiator role, and chronic assessment emerged. Low assessors demonstrated a pattern of means consistent with the focus-role fit effects found in Studies 1 and 2—more positive affect, better anticipated performance, and higher perceived assessment competence in fit than in non-fit. In contrast, high assessors showed the *opposite* pattern with fit negotiators reporting *less* positive preparatory responses as compared to non-fit negotiators.



Identifying an assessment orientation as a moderator of focus-role fit provides evidence that focus-role fit effects are due to the experience of feeling right. High assessors are suspicious of *feeling* right. To *do* right, they believe they need to correct biases from feeling right due to focus-role fit, and strong correction produces overcorrection. High assessors in fit report less positive preparatory responses than high assessors in non-fit. Low assessors in fit, on the other hand, are not motivated to perceive biases and thus their feeling right experience translates directly into more positive preparatory responses than low assessors in non-fit, replicating the previous pattern of focus-role fit effects. Study 3 reveals *how* focus-role fit influences negotiator responses (i.e. increased demand): focus-role fit creates a feeling of rightness that intensifies responses. Study 4 is designed to look at another aspect of focus-role fit's operation—the source of the fit between regulatory focus and negotiator role.

#### STUDY 4

Study 3 provided evidence that focus-role fit impacts responses through the experience of feeling right. Study 4 was designed to test another feature of focus-role fit. I hypothesized that focus-role fit is unlike traditional regulatory fit between a goal orientation and a strategy of goal pursuit (Higgins, 2000); *focus-role fit is a match between two goal orientations based on shared strategic preferences*. To test whether the strategic complementarities between regulatory focus and negotiator role are indeed the driving force behind focus-role fit, I manipulated strategy in a price negotiation in Study 4. When strategy is no longer a naturally occurring commonality between regulatory focus and negotiator role, but is itself situationally manipulated, then focus-role fit should disappear. In its place, I expected to uncover the two underlying component sources of

fit: a *focus-strategy* fit and a *role-strategy* fit. In contrast to focus-role fit, both focus-strategy fit and role-strategy fit are examples of traditional regulatory fit between a goal orientation (regulatory focus or negotiator role) and a strategy. Uncovering the components of fit will provide a fuller picture of the focus-role fit model (see Figure 9).

When negotiators are assigned to their naturally preferred strategy (prevention negotiators using a vigilant strategy or promotion negotiators using an eager strategy; buyers using a vigilant strategy or sellers using an eager strategy), they should experience fit because their goal orientation, whether regulatory focus or role, is sustained by their goal-pursuit strategy. Assignment to the opposite (non-matching) strategy should produce non-fit (prevention negotiators using an eager strategy or promotion negotiators using a vigilant strategy; buyers using an eager strategy or sellers using a vigilant strategy) because the goal orientation is disrupted by the mismatched goal strategy. When strategy is manipulated it is no longer a naturally occurring commonality between regulatory focus and negotiator role and, thus, focus-role fit should not occur.

Study 4 tested these hypotheses using the real, binding price negotiation over a notebook. I expected to replicate the differences in negotiator frame for buyers and sellers. Because strategy was manipulated, I expected to find focus-strategy fit effects and role-strategy fit effects. In particular, I predicted that participants in the focus-strategy fit conditions (prevention-vigilant and promotion-eager) and the role-strategy fit conditions (buyer-vigilant and seller-eager) would experience greater role fit and greater planned demand than the non-fit conditions (prevention-eager and promotion-vigilant; buyer-eager and seller-vigilant). In contrast, I did not expect to find focus-role fit effects.

Study 4 used a 2 (measured chronic regulatory focus: prevention vs. promotion) x 2 (manipulated strategy: vigilant vs. eager) x 2 (assigned negotiator role: buyer vs. seller) between-participants design.

## Method

### *Participants*

One hundred sixty students participated for \$8 compensation or 2 experimental credits. Six participants did not follow instructions and their data was excluded from all analyses. Thus, there were 154 participants (100 women and 54 men).

### *Procedure*

Participants either arrived in response to flyers or were scheduled using an online sign-up system. In order to form negotiation dyads, either two or four participants were run during each session. Participants signed a consent form and were told that we were running two short studies, a personality study and a negotiation study. Participants first completed “study 1,” which consisted of the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire.

The experimenter then explained that “study 2” was a negotiation study. Participants were randomly assigned to roles (buyer or seller) and randomly assigned to strategies (vigilant or eager, as described below), as well as pairs. They were told that they would be negotiating over a notebook with a university crest. Sellers were given a Columbia University notebook and buyers were given \$5 in singles. The experimenter explained that the negotiated outcome, whether impasse or agreement, would be binding and separate from compensation for participation. Outcomes were restricted to range between \$0 and \$10. Any agreement over \$5 would require additional money from the buyer above and beyond the \$5 endowment. (No agreements above \$5 were reached.)

Participants were allowed 15 minutes to complete a pre-negotiation questionnaire and prepare for the negotiation. Participants were then paired with their randomly assigned partner and given 15 minutes to negotiate. The experimenter oversaw the enactment of the negotiated outcome, whether impasse or agreement. (Although participants negotiated, the focus of my analyses was on their approach to the negotiation. Furthermore, there were not enough participants in each cell to reliably analyze outcome effects.) Lastly, participants were compensated (in addition to whatever outcome they had negotiated), debriefed, and thanked.

### *Materials*

#### *Regulatory Focus Questionnaire*

I again measured participants' chronic regulatory focus with the RFQ (Higgins et al., 2001). In this study, promotion pride and prevention pride scores were weakly positively correlated,  $r(154) = .21, p = .009$ . To calculate participants' predominant chronic regulatory focus, I first subtracted the prevention pride score ( $M = 3.44, SD = 0.82, \text{Cronbach's } \alpha = .83$ ) from the promotion pride score ( $M = 3.92, SD = 0.56, \text{Cronbach's } \alpha = .65$ ). Participants whose difference scores were greater than zero were identified as chronically promotion focus (103 participants) and participants whose difference scores were less than or equal to zero were identified as chronically prevention focus (51 participants). Analyses are based on this zero split on participants' difference scores.

#### *Case Information*

As in Study 2, the buyer was given \$5 whereas the seller was given a notebook bearing a Columbia University crest. The actual price of the notebook (\$3.98) was not

revealed to either party. The experimenter stressed that the negotiation was real and the negotiated outcome would be binding.

*Strategy manipulation.* In addition to their random assignment to a role, participants were randomly assigned to a strategy. For participants assigned to a vigilant strategy, the case information emphasized minimizing losses and meeting the reservation price. For participants assigned to an eager strategy, the case information emphasized maximizing gains and achieving the aspiration price (see Appendix B for the full text of the manipulation).

#### *Pre-negotiation Questionnaire*

Participants filled out the pre-negotiation questionnaire after receiving their role materials (\$5 for the buyer and the notebook for the seller). The questionnaire was comprised of a battery of measures designed to assess participants' pre-negotiation attitudes and strategies.

*Negotiator frame.* Four questions assessed how participants construed the upcoming negotiation. Participants were asked to rate the extent (1 = *absolutely not* to 7 = *absolutely yes*) to which they viewed the negotiation as a chance to create value, to minimize loss, to attain resources, and to maintain resources.

*Experienced role fit.* Four questions assessed participants' experience of fit or non-fit with their randomly assigned role. Participants were asked to rate to what extent (1 = *absolutely not* to 7 = *absolutely yes*) their roles were comfortable, felt like a good fit, were engaging, and felt right.

*Average right price.* Participants were asked to select the range of prices they considered fair or "right." The range of possible prices (\$0 to \$10) was divided into ten

intervals of \$1. Participants checked the appropriate interval(s) to indicate the price(s) they believed to be fair or right.

*Planned opening offer.* Participants were asked to indicate what their first offer would be if they were to open the negotiation. This question was free-response.

## Results

To assess how participants approached the negotiation, I conducted a series of 2 (chronic regulatory focus: prevention vs. promotion) x 2 (strategy: vigilant vs. eager) x 2 (role: buyer vs. seller) univariate analyses of variance with gender included as a covariate.

### *Negotiator Frame*

The ratings of minimize loss and maintain resources ( $r(154) = .46, p < .001$ ) were averaged to create a measure of *non-loss/loss framing*. There was a significant effect of gender,  $F(1, 145) = 5.15, p = .03$ .<sup>6</sup> Women ( $M = 4.14, SD = 1.28$ ) adopted more of a non-loss/loss frame than men ( $M = 3.62, SD = 1.45$ ). Most importantly, role was marginally significant,  $F(1, 145) = 3.51, p = .06$ . As predicted, buyers ( $M = 4.20, SD = 1.43$ ) approached the negotiation using non-loss/loss frames more than sellers ( $M = 3.72, SD = 1.25$ ), as shown in Figure 10a.

There was an unexpected significant effect of the three-way interaction between regulatory focus, strategy, and role,  $F(1, 145) = 4.17, p = .04$ . Prevention, vigilant buyers ( $M = 4.50, SD = 1.21$ ) were the most loss-framed and promotion, eager sellers ( $M = 3.56, SD = 1.27$ ) and prevention, vigilant sellers ( $M = 3.45, SD = 1.65$ ) were the least loss-

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<sup>6</sup> Although gender effects were not the focus of my analyses, significant gender effects did emerge in three studies. I will briefly discuss the impact of gender on negotiation preparation in the General Discussion.

framed. It is not clear exactly why this is the case, but certainly prevention, vigilant buyers would be expected to be the most loss-framed and they were.

Similarly, the ratings of create value and attain resources ( $r(154) = .69, p < .001$ ) were averaged to create a measure of *gain/non-gain framing*. There was again a significant effect of gender,  $F(1, 145) = 7.40, p = .007$ . Men ( $M = 5.13, SD = 1.34$ ) adopted more of a gain/non-gain frame than women ( $M = 4.52, SD = 1.28$ ). Most importantly, role was again marginally significant,  $F(1, 145) = 3.43, p = .07$ . As predicted, sellers ( $M = 4.89, SD = 1.30$ ) approached the negotiation using gain/non-gain frames more than buyers ( $M = 4.57, SD = 1.35$ ), as shown in Figure 10b.

#### *Experienced Role Fit*

Because the measures assessing participants' feelings about their assigned role (role comfort, fit, engagement, and rightness) were highly intercorrelated (Cronbach's  $\alpha = .84$ ), I created a measure of *experienced role fit* by averaging the four ratings. Gender was a non-significant trend,  $F(1, 145) = 2.68, p = .10$ , with men ( $M = 4.74, SD = 1.18$ ) tending to report experiencing greater fit than women ( $M = 4.31, SD = 1.12$ ).

Most important for my hypotheses were the results of the three two-way interactions. First, as predicted, the Regulatory Focus x Role interaction was not significant,  $p > .5$ . Second, as predicted, the Regulatory Focus x Strategy interaction *was* significant,  $F(1, 145) = 5.61, p = .02$ . As shown in Figure 11a, prevention negotiators using a vigilant strategy ( $M = 4.45, SD = 1.34$ ) reported experiencing greater fit than prevention negotiators using an eager strategy ( $M = 4.13, SD = 0.94$ ), whereas promotion negotiators using an eager strategy ( $M = 4.88, SD = 1.12$ ) reported experiencing greater fit than promotion negotiators using a vigilant strategy ( $M = 4.18, SD = 1.06$ ). Planned

contrast tests showed that, while the difference in means for prevention negotiators using a vigilant versus eager strategy was non-significant in the predicted direction,  $t(150) = 1.00, p > .2$ , the difference in means for promotion negotiators using an eager versus vigilant strategy was highly significant,  $t(150) = -3.18, p = .002$ .

Third, as predicted, the Role x Strategy interaction was significant,  $F(1, 145) = 4.02, p = .05$ . As shown in Figure 11b, buyers using a vigilant strategy ( $M = 4.61, SD = 0.97$ ) reported experiencing greater fit than buyers using an eager strategy ( $M = 4.60, SD = 1.14$ ), whereas sellers using an eager strategy ( $M = 4.70, SD = 1.11$ ) reported experiencing greater fit than sellers using a vigilant strategy ( $M = 3.94, SD = 1.26$ ). Planned contrast tests showed that, while the difference in means for buyers using a vigilant versus eager strategy was non-significant in the predicted direction,  $t(150) = 0.03, p > .5$ , the difference in means for sellers using an eager versus vigilant strategy was highly significant,  $t(150) = -2.99, p = .003$ .

To test for a replication of the patterns of focus-role fit found in the previous studies when strategy was allowed to vary naturally, I conducted planned contrast tests. Indeed, prevention buyers using a vigilant strategy ( $M = 4.66, SD = 1.13$ ) reported greater fit than promotion buyers using a vigilant strategy ( $M = 4.57, SD = 0.85$ ), although this difference was non-significant,  $t(74) = 0.28, p > .5$ . Promotion sellers using an eager strategy ( $M = 4.94, SD = 1.09$ ) reported significantly greater fit than prevention sellers using an eager strategy ( $M = 4.21, SD = 1.01$ ),  $t(74) = 2.10, p = .04$ .

#### *Planned Demand*

Participants reported planned demand in two ways: selecting a range of prices as fair or right and listing their planned opening offer. As in Study 1, I calculated the



average price selected as right from the range of prices indicated. Average right price and planned opening offer were highly correlated,  $r(150) = .73, p < .001$ . I standardized both measures of demand following the procedures outlined in Study 1. I averaged standardized average right price and standardized planned opening offer to create a measure of *planned demand*. Higher values indicate greater planned demand (more demanding average prices selected as right and more demanding planned opening offers) than others in the same role.

#### *Univariate Analysis of Variance*

To investigate the effects of fit on planned demand, I looked at the subset of participants experiencing relatively more fit (identified by median split on the experienced role fit variable).<sup>7</sup> For these 81 participants, there was a main effect of gender,  $F(1, 72) = 8.61, p = .004$ . Men ( $M = 0.29, SD = 0.95$ ) expressed more demand than women ( $M = -0.18, SD = 0.82$ ). Once again the three two-way interactions were most important for my hypotheses. First, Regulatory Focus x Role was an unexpected non-significant trend,  $F(1, 72) = 2.79, p = .10$ . Prevention buyers ( $M = -0.16, SD = 1.05$ ) were less demanding than promotion buyers ( $M = 0.07, SD = 0.78$ ), whereas promotion sellers ( $M = -0.02, SD = 0.88$ ) were less demanding than prevention sellers ( $M = 0.06, SD = 1.06$ ); I will explore this pattern of results in the Discussion.

Second, as predicted, the interaction between regulatory focus and strategy was highly significant,  $F(1, 72) = 7.93, p = .006$ . As shown in Figure 12a, prevention negotiators using a vigilant strategy ( $M = 0.18, SD = 0.91$ ) were more demanding than prevention negotiators using an eager strategy ( $M = -0.45, SD = 1.17$ ), whereas promotion negotiators using an eager strategy ( $M = 0.12, SD = 0.91$ ) were more

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<sup>7</sup> The pattern of results is overwhelmed by a main effect of strategy when looking at all participants.

demanding than promotion negotiators using a vigilant strategy ( $M = -0.11, SD = 0.71$ ). Planned contrast tests showed that the difference in means for prevention negotiators using a vigilant versus eager strategy was marginally significant,  $t(77) = 1.70, p = .09$ , and the difference in means for promotion negotiators using an eager versus vigilant strategy was non-significant in the predicted direction,  $t(77) = -0.96, p > .2$ .

Third, as predicted, the interaction between role and strategy was highly significant,  $F(1, 72) = 7.14, p = .009$ . As shown in Figure 12b, buyers using a vigilant strategy ( $M = 0.13, SD = 0.62$ ) were more demanding than buyers using an eager strategy ( $M = -0.21, SD = 1.14$ ), whereas sellers using an eager strategy ( $M = 0.12, SD = 0.88$ ) were more demanding than sellers negotiators using a vigilant strategy ( $M = -0.18, SD = 0.98$ ). Planned contrast tests indicated that the differences in means were in the predicted directions but were non-significant for buyers,  $t(77) = 1.18, p > .2$ , or sellers,  $t(77) = -1.08, p > .2$ .

There was also a significant three-way interaction between regulatory focus, strategy, and role,  $F(1, 72) = 6.85, p = .01$ . This interaction is mostly driven by prevention, eager buyers, who were significantly less demanding than any of the other negotiators. Since there were only 3 such negotiators, not much should be made of this effect.

To test for a replication of the patterns of focus-role fit found in the previous studies when strategy was allowed to vary naturally, I again conducted planned contrast tests. Indeed, prevention buyers using a vigilant strategy ( $M = 0.27, SD = 0.66$ ) were more demanding than promotion buyers using a vigilant strategy ( $M = 0.03, SD = 0.60$ ), although this difference was non-significant,  $t(44) = 0.77, p > .2$ . Similarly, promotion

sellers using an eager strategy ( $M = 0.13$ ,  $SD = 0.90$ ) were non-significantly more demanding than prevention sellers using an eager strategy ( $M = 0.11$ ,  $SD = 0.86$ ),  $t(44) = 0.04$ ,  $p > .5$ .

### *Mediation Analysis*

To test my prediction that experienced role fit would mediate the relationship between both focus-strategy fit and demand and role-strategy fit and demand, I conducted a series of linear regressions, on all participants, following the steps outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986). Across regressions, the basic model included the following predictors: gender (contrast coded: men = -1; women = +1), predominant chronic regulatory focus (contrast coded: prevention = -1; promotion = +1), strategy (contrast coded: vigilant = -1; eager = +1), negotiator role (contrast coded: buyer = -1; seller = +1), Regulatory Focus x Role, Regulatory Focus x Strategy, Role x Strategy, and Regulatory Focus x Strategy x Role.

In step 1, I regressed experienced role fit (the proposed mediator) onto the model. Two predictors reached significance: Regulatory Focus x Strategy,  $B = 0.23$ ,  $SE = 0.10$ ,  $t(145) = 2.37$ ,  $p = .02$ , and Role x Strategy,  $B = 0.19$ ,  $SE = 0.10$ ,  $t(145) = 2.00$ ,  $p = .05$ . In step 2, I regressed standardized planned demand (the dependent variable) onto the model. Regulatory Focus x Role was marginally significant,  $B = -0.15$ ,  $SE = 0.08$ ,  $t(141) = -1.91$ ,  $p = .06$ . In step 3, I regressed standardized planned demand (the dependent variable) onto the model plus experienced role fit (the proposed mediator). Regulatory Focus x Role was again significant,  $B = -0.14$ ,  $SE = 0.07$ ,  $t(140) = -1.94$ ,  $p = .05$ . More importantly, experienced role fit was highly significant,  $B = 0.26$ ,  $SE = 0.06$ ,  $t(140) = 4.14$ ,  $p < .001$ . I used bootstrapping methods to test for mediation, as recommended by Shrout and Bolger

(2002). These tests confirmed that *experienced role fit* significantly mediated the relationship between focus-strategy fit and standardized planned demand ( $p = .02$ ), and between role-strategy fit and standardized planned demand ( $p = .04$ ).

### Discussion

Study 4 investigated the components of focus-role fit. I hypothesized that focus-role fit was driven by the strategic complementarities between regulatory focus and negotiator role. To test this, Study 4 manipulated strategy in a price negotiation. As predicted, I replicated the effects of role on negotiator frame—buyers adopted a non-loss/loss frame of the negotiation whereas sellers adopted a gain/non-gain frame of the negotiation.

As predicted, on a measure of experienced role fit, effects of *focus-strategy* fit and *role-strategy* fit emerged, whereas *focus-role* fit was noticeably absent. In this price negotiation, prevention negotiators using a vigilant strategy and promotion negotiators using an eager strategy (*focus-strategy* fit) experienced a greater fit than prevention negotiators using an eager strategy and promotion negotiators using a vigilant strategy (*focus-strategy* non-fit). Likewise, vigilant buyers and eager sellers (*role-strategy* fit) experienced a greater fit than eager buyers and vigilant sellers (*role-strategy* non-fit). This pattern of results demonstrates that there is a fit between regulatory focus and strategy, and between negotiator role and strategy. When strategy is manipulated, it is no longer a naturally occurring commonality between regulatory focus and negotiator role; focus-role fit is eliminated.

Also as predicted, I found focus-strategy fit and role-strategy fit effects on planned demand for participants experiencing relatively more fit. Given that Study 3

suggested that focus-role fit effects are due to the experience of fit, it is not surprising that fit effects are stronger for participants experiencing greater fit. In fact, fit should only impact responses to the extent that it creates an experience of fit. Within participants experiencing relatively more fit, prevention negotiators using a vigilant strategy and promotion negotiators using an eager strategy (focus-strategy fit) reported greater planned demand than prevention negotiators using an eager strategy and promotion negotiators using a vigilant strategy (focus-strategy non-fit). Similarly, vigilant buyers and eager sellers (role-strategy fit) reported greater planned demand than eager buyers and vigilant sellers (role-strategy non-fit). Focus-strategy fit and role-strategy fit both impact planned demand. For planned demand, focus-role fit effects were reversed. This effect was mostly driven by prevention buyers, who were less demanding than any of the other negotiators. It is not clear why focus-role fit effects would reverse, or why prevention buyers specifically would be less demanding, when strategy is manipulated. When strategy is manipulated, we see effects of focus-strategy fit and role-strategy fit in lieu of the pattern of focus-role fit that we usually see in price negotiations,.

In Study 4, I also found that experienced role fit predicted planned demand. Negotiators experiencing greater fit were more demanding. Experienced role fit significantly mediated the relationship between focus-strategy fit and demand and role-strategy fit and demand. This provides convergent evidence, along with Study 3, that focus-role fit impacts negotiator responses through the experience of feeling right. Although I did not find direct effects of fit on planned demand using the entire sample, this is not necessary for mediation to occur (MacKinnon & Fairchild, 2009; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Moreover, there were direct effects of fit on demand for those participants

who experienced relatively more fit. This suggests that other variables may have obscured the direct relation across all participants. For example, participants in fit on one dimension (e.g., focus-strategy fit) but not the other dimension (e.g., role-strategy fit) may have had a weaker experience of fit and may have had less intensified demand.

Despite these limitations, Study 4 successfully demonstrated that, when strategy is manipulated, the components of focus-role fit—focus-strategy fit and role-strategy fit—emerge. In this price negotiation, participants in the conditions of focus-strategy fit (prevention-vigilant and promotion-eager) or role-strategy fit (buyer-vigilant and seller-eager) experienced greater fit with their roles and planned to be more demanding than participants in non-fit (prevention-eager and promotion-vigilant; buyer-eager and seller-vigilant). The typical patterns of focus-role fit did not emerge when strategy was manipulated. Study 4 provided evidence that focus-role fit is driven by the strategic commonalities between negotiator role and regulatory focus.

#### Summary of Studies 1- 4

Studies 1 and 2 introduced focus-role fit in price negotiations. Prevention buyers and promotion sellers (fit) experienced greater fit with their roles, planned to be more demanding, and opened with more demanding offers than promotion buyers and prevention sellers (non-fit). When paired, negotiators in fit impassed more often than other dyads. Studies 3 and 4 clarified how focus-role fit operates.

In Study 3, I found evidence that focus-role fit impacts negotiator responses through the ensuing experience of feeling right. Assessment orientation moderated focus-role fit—low assessors in fit (vs. non-fit) reported intensified responses (replicating the pattern of results from Studies 1 and 2) whereas high assessors in fit (vs. non-fit),

sensitive to the bias in responding due to fit, overcorrected and reported the opposite. The results of Study 4 replicated the effect of role on negotiator frame and indicated that focus-role fit is created by the shared strategic preferences of regulatory focus and negotiator role. When strategy was manipulated, focus-role fit was replaced by focus-strategy fit and role-strategy fit, each of which impacted experienced fit and planned demand. Experienced fit mediated the relationship between focus-strategy fit and demand and role-strategy fit and demand, again providing evidence that fit effects on negotiator responses (i.e., intensified demand) are due to the experience of feeling right from fit.

Together, these four studies suggest one process by which role assignment impacts outcomes. Role assignment determines negotiator frame. Negotiator frame then determines the preferred strategy, which either matches the negotiator's chronic regulatory focus to create focus-role fit, or mismatches to create non-fit. Focus-role fit creates a subjective feeling of rightness about negotiators' responses to the upcoming negotiation. This feeling of rightness intensifies responses, leading to greater planned demand and actual demand. When two fit negotiators are paired, their increased levels of demand conflict, yielding higher impasse rates.

Studies 5 and 6 move for the first time beyond price negotiations to investigate other types of negotiations. Study 5 used a hypothetical negotiation about information to find a reversal in framing—buyers adopt gain/non-gain frames of the negotiation and sellers adopt non-loss/loss frames of the negotiation. Study 5 provides evidence that the direction of the relationship between role and negotiator frame depends on what the negotiation is *about* (Higgins, 1998). Although different classes of negotiations (e.g.,

price, non-price, multi-issue) should yield different patterns of results, across negotiations role will define the situation.

Study 6 advances beyond single-issue negotiations between buyer and seller to examine the impact of role more broadly. In a multi-issue negotiation where each role faces a gain/non-gain issue *and* a non-loss/loss issue, role dictates the meaning of each issue and interacts with the emphasized issue to influence negotiation preparation and outcomes. Study 6 confirms that role impacts negotiations, even when they have multiple issues.

## STUDY 5

To explore a new direction, Study 5 used a negotiation about a different issue. In price negotiations, buyers approach the negotiation in terms of non-losses and losses whereas sellers approach the same negotiation in terms of gains and non-gains, as evidenced by Studies 2 and 4. I hypothesized that this framing is due to buyers' goal of minimizing monetary loss and sellers' goal of maximizing monetary gain. Because role predicts negotiators' framing of the negotiation through its associated goals, changing negotiators' goals should change their framing. In other words, a framing reversal should be possible. If there were a negotiation where buyers wanted to maximize gains and sellers wanted to minimize losses, negotiator frames should reverse. For instance, imagine a negotiation where buyers are told that they must obtain certain key information in order to complete the negotiation and sellers are told that they must not reveal this key information in order to complete the negotiation. In this case, buyers should seek to maximize information gain whereas sellers should seek to minimize information loss. Therefore, in contrast to price negotiations, buyers should now adopt gain/non-gain



frames of the negotiation and sellers should now adopt non-loss/loss frames of the negotiation.

Given this reversal, an eager strategy would best support buyers' gain-maximization goal and a vigilant strategy would best support sellers' loss-minimization goal. The strategic commonality is now between buyers and a promotion focus and sellers and a prevention focus. Promotion buyers and prevention sellers should be in focus-role fit whereas prevention buyers and promotion sellers should be in non-fit. Because regulatory fit intensifies negotiator responses, as seen in Studies 1-4, promotion buyers and prevention sellers should experience greater role fit and express greater planned demand than prevention buyers and promotion sellers.

To look for these two reversals, a reversal in negotiator frames and a reversal in the conditions of focus-role fit, Study 5 used a 2 (measured chronic regulatory focus: prevention vs. promotion) x 2 (assigned negotiator role: buyer vs. seller) between-participants design.

## Method

### *Participants*

One hundred thirty students (79 women and 51 men) participated for \$8 compensation or 2 experimental credits. Data from 19 participants was excluded from all analyses: 14 participants were given the wrong materials and 5 participants did not complete the study. These exclusions resulted in 111 participants (67 women and 44 men).

### *Procedure*

Participants either arrived in response to flyers or were scheduled using an online sign-up system. In order to form negotiation dyads, either two or four participants were run during each session. Participants signed a consent form and were told that we were running two short studies, a personality study and a negotiation study. Participants first completed “study 1,” which consisted of the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire.

The experimenter then explained that “study 2” was a negotiation called “Bullard Houses.” Participants were randomly assigned to pairs and to roles (buyer or seller). The experimenter passed out the case information and the pre-negotiation questionnaires, allowing participants fifteen minutes to read and prepare. Participants were then paired with their randomly assigned partner and given 15 minutes to negotiate. (Although participants negotiated, the focus of my analyses was on their approach to the negotiation.) Lastly, participants were compensated, debriefed and thanked.

### *Materials*

#### *Regulatory Focus Questionnaire*

I again measured participants’ chronic regulatory focus with the RFQ (Higgins et al., 2001). In this study, promotion pride and prevention pride scores were weakly positively correlated,  $r(111) = .26, p = .007$ . To calculate participants’ predominant chronic regulatory focus, I first subtracted the prevention pride score ( $M = 3.45, SD = 0.89, \text{Cronbach's } \alpha = .85$ ) from the promotion pride score ( $M = 3.91, SD = 0.59, \text{Cronbach's } \alpha = .70$ ). Participants whose difference scores were greater than zero were identified as chronically promotion focus (77 participants) and participants whose difference scores were less than or equal to zero were identified as chronically prevention

focus (34 participants). Analyses are based on this zero split on participants' difference scores.

### *Case Information*

“Bullard Houses” was written for the Harvard Negotiation Project and further developed by the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg School of Management. Both buyer and seller are agents with explicit demands from their clients. The case is written so that the negotiation has two issues, price and information. Information is the central issue. I adapted the case to further increase the emphasis on information (see Appendix C for the full case information).

The seller is an agent of the Bullard family. Although the family wants to sell the Houses, their first priority is that certain aspects of the Houses' history are not revealed. The buyer is an agent of a historical inn society. The society wants to buy the Houses, but their first priority is full disclosure of the Houses' history. Price is a secondary concern for both parties. Because information is the paramount concern for both parties (and the two parties have opposing preferences on this issue), an impasse is the outcome in both parties' best interests.

### *Pre-negotiation Questionnaire*

Participants filled out the pre-negotiation questionnaire after they received the case information. The questionnaire was comprised of a battery of measures designed to assess participants' pre-negotiation attitudes and strategies.

*Issue importance.* Three questions assessed how participants divided their attention between the two issues, information and price. Participants were asked to divide 100 points between the two issues to reflect their relative importance. Participants were

also asked how important (1 = *absolutely not* to 7 = *absolutely yes*) it was to obtain the best price possible and to obtain / not reveal the history of the Houses.

*Negotiator frame.* Four questions assessed how participants construed the upcoming negotiation. Participants were asked to rate the extent (1 = *absolutely not* to 7 = *absolutely yes*) to which they viewed the negotiation as a chance to create value, to minimize loss, to attain resources, and to maintain resources.

*Experienced role fit.* Four questions assessed participants' experience of fit or non-fit with their randomly assigned role. Participants were asked to rate to what extent (1 = *absolutely not* to 7 = *absolutely yes*) their roles were comfortable, felt like a good fit, were engaging, and felt right.

*Planned opening offer.* Participants were asked to indicate what their first offer would be if they were to open the negotiation. This question was free-response.

## Results

To assess how participants approached the negotiation, I conducted a series of 2 (chronic regulatory focus: prevention vs. promotion) x 2 (role: buyer vs. seller) univariate analyses of variance with gender included as a covariate.

### *Issue Importance*

Participants allocated more points to information than price ( $M = 63.45$  vs.  $M = 36.55$ ,  $SD = 20.25$ ).<sup>8</sup> A one-sample t-test showed that participants weighed information significantly more than a 50-50 even split,  $t(109) = 6.97$ ,  $p < .001$ . The two Likert-style ratings questions yielded the same pattern. Participants rated information ( $M = 6.54$ ,  $SD =$

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<sup>8</sup> I analyzed each of the three measures of issue importance separately because they were not highly intercorrelated (Cronbach's  $\alpha = .55$ ).

1.07) as more important than price ( $M = 5.65$ ,  $SD = 1.21$ ). A one-sample t-test showed this difference to be significant,  $t(110) = 5.31$ ,  $p < .001$ .

There were no significant predictors of the relative issue weighting measure or of the rating of information's importance. For the rating of price's importance, there was a marginally significant main effect of regulatory focus,  $F(1, 106) = 3.20$ ,  $SD = .08$ . Prevention participants ( $M = 5.29$ ,  $SD = 1.27$ ) rated price as less important than promotion participants ( $M = 5.81$ ,  $SD = 1.16$ ). This is consistent with prevention participants' greater concern for duties and obligations (Higgins, 1997), which in this case dictate that price is a secondary concern.

#### *Negotiator Frame*

The ratings of minimize loss and maintain resources ( $r(110) = .31$ ,  $p = .001$ ) were averaged to create a measure of *non-loss/loss framing*. As predicted, role was a significant predictor of non-loss/loss frame,  $F(1, 105) = 13.98$ ,  $p < .001$ , in the *opposite* direction as in the price negotiation studies. As shown in Figure 13a, sellers ( $M = 4.23$ ,  $SD = 1.05$ ) approached the negotiation using non-loss/loss frames more than buyers ( $M = 3.52$ ,  $SD = 0.97$ ).

Likewise, the ratings of create value and attain resources ( $r(110) = .53$ ,  $p < .001$ ) were averaged to create a measure of *gain/non-gain framing*. Gender was marginally significant,  $F(1, 105) = 3.42$ ,  $p = .07$ . Men ( $M = 4.95$ ,  $SD = 0.87$ ) adopted a gain/non-gain frame more than women ( $M = 4.63$ ,  $SD = 1.19$ ). As predicted, role was a significant predictor of gain/non-gain frame,  $F(1, 105) = 4.45$ ,  $p = .04$ , again in the *opposite* direction as in the price negotiation studies. As shown in Figure 13b, buyers ( $M = 4.98$ ,

$SD = 0.84$ ) approached the negotiation using gain/non-gain frames more than sellers ( $M = 4.57, SD = 1.23$ ),.

#### *Experienced Role Fit*

Because the measures assessing participants' feelings about their assigned role (role comfort, fit, engagement, and rightness) were highly intercorrelated (Cronbach's  $\alpha = .88$ ), I created a measure of *experienced role fit* by averaging the four ratings. There was a significant main effect of gender,  $F(1, 105) = 6.25, p = .01$ . Men ( $M = 4.60, SD = 1.01$ ) reported experiencing greater fit than women ( $M = 4.06, SD = 1.21$ ). The interaction of regulatory focus and role was not significant,  $p > .2$ . Focus-role fit may have been eliminated, rather than reversed, a possibility I will explore in the Discussion.

#### *Planned Opening Offer*

Planned opening offer was standardized following the procedures outlined in Study 1. *Higher values indicate a more demanding planned opening offer* than others in the same role. There was a marginally significant main effect of gender,  $F(1, 105) = 3.40, p = .07$ . Men ( $M = 0.21, SD = 1.15$ ) were more demanding than women ( $M = -0.14, SD = 0.86$ ). The interaction of regulatory focus and role was not significant,  $p > .5$ . Again, this suggests that focus-role fit was eliminated. I will explore possible reasons for this in the Discussion.

#### Discussion

Study 5 found, for the first time, a reversal in the frames associated with the buyer and seller roles. As in Studies 2 and 4, role was a significant predictor of negotiator frame. However, in contrast to price negotiations, in this negotiation where information was the primary concern, buyers adopted a gain/non-gain frame (to maximize

information gain) and sellers adopted a non-loss/loss frame (to minimize information loss). This is evidence that negotiator frame is not fixed, but instead depends on the construal of the issue(s) under negotiation, which in turn depends on the goals associated with the role.

Although I predicted that a reversal in negotiator frame would lead to a reversal in the conditions creating regulatory fit, Study 5 did not provide evidence for a focus-role fit reversal. On two measures, experienced role fit and planned demand, focus-role fit was eliminated. There are several possible explanations for this elimination. First, I did not include a measure of demand for information. Negotiators in focus-role fit might be more demanding for information (their primary issue) than non-fit negotiators, but equally demanding for price (their secondary issue).

Second, price was still an issue in this negotiation. Although participants rated information to be significantly more important than price, they rated both issues as highly important. In the Likert-style rating measures, both issues were rated significantly higher than the midpoint of the scales,  $t(110) = 25.05, p < .001$  for information and  $t(110) = 14.34, p < .001$  for price. The greater emphasis on information may have been enough to reverse the frame with which negotiators approached the negotiation, but insufficient to create a fit experience. Furthermore, the correlation between the two Likert-style issue rating measures was weak,  $r(111) = -.20, p = .03$ , indicating that some participants may have emphasized one issue over the other, whereas other participants may have emphasized both issues. In other words, this may have been experienced as a single-issue negotiation for some participants, but as a multi-issue negotiation for other participants.

Third, the negotiation is between the agents of the principal parties rather than the principals themselves. Given the prevention focus concern with duties and obligations (Higgins, 1997), this agent role may have been more meaningful to prevention participants than to promotion participants concerned with ideals and aspirations. Prevention negotiators may have been more careful to heed client instructions that information is the primary concern, whereas promotion negotiators may have tended to emphasize price regardless of client instructions. Indeed there is evidence for this in the analyses of issue importance—prevention participants were less concerned with price than promotion participants.

These three issues suggest that a cleaner test of my hypothesis is warranted. The ideal negotiation case would involve negotiators who are the principal parties, feature a single, divisible issue, and have measures of demand related to that issue. I am currently running a study that meets each of these requirements. It is a real, binding, fixed-price negotiation over quantity. Specifically, the buyer is given a fixed amount of money (a single \$1 bill) and the seller is given a quantity of candy (11 Reese's peanut butter cups). Because the negotiators have strict instructions that the dollar cannot be broken, quantity is the only negotiable issue. The negotiation is *about* quantity (Higgins, 1998). In such a negotiation, buyers should want to maximize quantity gained whereas sellers should want to minimize quantity lost. Thus, I expect a framing reversal—buyers should adopt a gain/non-gain frame and sellers should adopt a non-loss/loss frame. Given that quantity is the only issue and both negotiators are principal agents, I also expect a focus-role fit reversal such that promotion buyers and prevention sellers are in fit whereas prevention buyers and promotion sellers are in non-fit. Negotiators in fit should experience greater



fit and express greater demand *on quantity*. This study should address the limitations of Study 5 and test focus-role fit in a negotiation about an issue other than price.

After establishing a reversal in the conditions of focus-role fit, a follow-up study could thoroughly illustrate the flexibility inherent in this model. What the negotiation is about (i.e., the emphasized issue) combines with assigned role to determine negotiator frame and, consequently, the conditions of focus-role fit. Imagine a negotiation over a box of pens. In one condition, the buyer is given \$5 in singles whereas the seller is given a closed box of six pens. The negotiation is about how many dollars for the box—price as usual. In the other condition, the buyer is given a single \$5 bill whereas the seller is given an open box of six pens. Now the negotiation is about how many pens for \$5—it is about the (quantity of) pens. Across the two conditions, I would predict opposite negotiator frames and opposite conditions of focus-role fit. Altering the emphasized issue (i.e., what the negotiation is about) should reverse negotiator frames as well as how role combines with regulatory focus to create focus-role fit. A third condition of this study is also possible—the buyer is given \$5 in singles and the seller is given an open box of six pens. Here there are 2 negotiable issues. Study 6 investigates such a negotiation with two equally viable issues.

Although it did not find a reversal in the conditions of focus-role fit, Study 5 was an important exploration of a different class of negotiations—those emphasizing issues other than price. Study 5 established for the first time that buyers do not always approach negotiations in terms of non-losses and losses, nor do sellers always approach negotiations in terms of gains and non-gains. Instead, role predicts frame, depending on the issue(s) under negotiation. Study 6 builds upon this idea using a true multi-issue

negotiation with two issues that are, a priori, equally important, but differently framed for each negotiator. Role determines the meaning of each issue and interacts with the emphasized issue to influence negotiator frame, demand, and outcome. Study 6 moves beyond focus-role fit to look at the impact of negotiator role more generally.

## STUDY 6

Studies 1 through 5 established focus-role fit in price negotiations, uncovered its mechanics, and conducted initial tests of its operation in negotiations emphasizing issues other than price. Across these five studies, negotiator role effects emerged repeatedly. Assignment to the buyer role or the seller role impacted how negotiators chose to frame the upcoming negotiation and conspired to create fit, or not, with negotiators' chronic regulatory focus. Across studies, in fact, negotiator role was the only consistent predictor of frame, even when, as in the notebook negotiations, the role manipulation was merely a verbal assignment to one role or the other, without any instructions about what the role meant or what its accompanying goals should be. Clearly role is a powerful determinant of negotiators' experience and behavior. The purpose of Study 6 was to further investigate the impact of role.

### *Beyond Buyer and Seller*

Study 6 differed from the previous studies in two important ways. First, the previous five studies used negotiations between a buyer and a seller. Intuition suggests that these roles have automatic associations—think of the careful homebuyer or the oily used-car salesman. In addition, people have extensive experience with buyer-seller negotiations. Even though people, as consumers, are more commonly buyers than sellers, they interact frequently with sellers and have an understanding of their part in

negotiations. More importantly, evidence from the previous five studies suggests that these two roles invoke schema of what it means to be a buyer or a seller, what their goals are, and how they should behave.

Study 6, then, used a negotiation with different roles to test whether role assignment would still impact negotiators' experience and behavior. I selected a negotiation between a candidate and a recruiter. Presumably, people (including undergraduate participants) have some familiarity with the concept of job negotiations. Yet, because they are not as integral a part of their everyday experience as buyer and seller roles, candidate and recruiter roles are less likely to carry automatic associations to the same degree. One may think of the demanding candidate or recruiter, but I would argue that these roles invoke stereotypes or schemas less strongly, if at all. Thus, these roles are a purer test of the general significance of role assignment in negotiation.

#### *Beyond Single-Issue Negotiations*

The second major departure of Study 6 was the use of a multi-issue negotiation. Studies 1 through 4 used single-issue negotiations. Although the negotiation in Study 5 technically involved two issues, one issue was much more important than the other. In these studies, role may have had such a strong impact because it had a clear relation to negotiator frame. When there is only one negotiable issue, the negotiation can only be about that issue and thus only one frame is possible for each role. If price is the only issue, for example, buyers should minimize monetary loss and adopt non-loss/loss frames, whereas sellers should maximize monetary gain and adopt gain/non-gain frames. This direct relation between role and negotiator frame may have driven negotiator

behavior in the first five studies. Study 6 was carefully designed to have two negotiable issues that were, a priori, equally important.

In Study 6, candidates and recruiters negotiated over weekly hours and annual salary. Each issue is a non-loss/loss for one role and a gain/non-gain for the other. Put differently, each role is faced with one non-loss/loss issue and one gain/non-gain issue. For candidates, hours represent a non-loss/loss and salary represents a gain/non-gain. Candidates should want to minimize hours worked, but maximize salary paid. For recruiters, the converse is true—hours represent a gain/non-gain and salary represents a non-loss/loss. Recruiters should want to maximize hours worked, but minimize salary paid. Each negotiator has two goals and, thus, there are two ways to frame the negotiation, depending on which issue is predominant. The choice of which issue to emphasize (and therefore what the negotiation was *about* for each negotiator) was left entirely to negotiators' discretion. Study 6 tested the impact of role assignment when each role faced multiple goals and, consequently, multiple possible frames.

### *Hypotheses*

#### *Relative Issue Emphasis*

Because Study 6 was the first multi-issue negotiation in this series of studies, it was partly an exploration of the effects of role, emphasized issue, and their interaction. Negotiators were free to emphasize either issue, or both issues. It was an open question whether all negotiators would emphasize salary more (because of the salience of money) or emphasize both issues equally. Alternatively, negotiators might emphasize their non-loss/loss issue more or their gain/non-gain issue more.

Relating back to focus-role fit, another possibility was that negotiators might emphasize the issue that would create a fit between their chronic regulatory focus and assigned negotiator role. For candidates, an emphasis on hours (non-loss/loss issue) would match a prevention focus because of shared vigilant strategic preferences, whereas an emphasis on salary (gain/non-gain issue) would match a promotion focus because of shared eager strategic preferences. For recruiters, the converse would be true—an emphasis on hours (gain/non-gain issue) would match a promotion focus because of shared eager strategic preferences, whereas an emphasis on salary (non-loss/loss issue) would match a prevention focus because of shared vigilant strategic preferences.

Therefore, prevention candidates and promotion recruiters might emphasize hours whereas promotion candidates and prevention recruiters might emphasize salary. If so, they should experience more fit than negotiators emphasizing their non-fit issue. To test these predictions, I measured chronic regulatory focus and asked participants about their relative issue emphasis and their experience of fit.

### *Negotiator Frame*

I was also interested in what happened following participants' selection of an issue to emphasize. The meaning of the emphasized issue is determined by the role, so would role and emphasized issue interact to predict frame, demand, and outcomes? For negotiator frame, I predicted an interaction between role and emphasized issue such that negotiators emphasizing their non-loss/loss issue (candidates emphasizing hours and recruiters emphasizing salary) would adopt more of a non-loss/loss frame than negotiators emphasizing their gain-non/gain issue (candidates emphasizing salary and recruiters emphasizing hours). Equivalently, I predicted that negotiators emphasizing

their gain-non/gain issue would adopt more of a gain/non-gain frame than negotiators emphasizing their non-loss/loss issue. To test these predictions, I measured relative issue emphasis and negotiator frame.

### *Negotiator Demand*

For negotiator demand, I had three hypotheses about the effects of role and emphasized issue. Negotiators could express demand in terms of hours and/or in terms of salary.

**Hypothesis 1:** There will be a main effect of issue emphasis. Negotiators will be more demanding on their emphasized issue and less demanding on the other issue. In other words, across roles, negotiators emphasizing hours (vs. salary) will be more demanding on hours whereas negotiators emphasizing salary (vs. hours) will be more demanding on salary.

**Hypothesis 2:** There will be an interaction of role and emphasized issue.

**Hypothesis 2a:** Role and issue emphasis will interact such that negotiators are more demanding on their emphasized issue if and only if that issue represents a *non-loss/loss* for them. In other words, negotiators will be *more demanding on their non-loss/loss issue, if they also emphasize that issue* (vs. their gain/non-gain issue). *There will be no difference in demand on their gain/non-gain issue as a function of emphasized issue.* Candidates emphasizing hours (vs. salary) will be more demanding on hours (their non-loss/loss issue), but there will be no difference in hours demand for recruiters as a function of emphasized issue. Conversely, recruiters emphasizing salary (vs. hours) will be more demanding on salary (their non-loss/loss issue), but there will be no difference in salary demand for candidates as a function of emphasized issue.

**Hypothesis 2b:** The opposite will be true. Role and issue emphasis will instead interact such that negotiators are more demanding on their emphasized issue if and only if that issue represents a *gain/non-gain* for them. In other words, negotiators will be *more demanding on their gain/non-gain issue, if they also emphasize that issue* (vs. their non-loss/loss issue). *There will be no difference in demand on their non-loss/loss issue as a function of emphasized issue.* Candidates emphasizing salary (vs. hours) will be more demanding on salary (their gain/non-gain issue), but there will be no difference in salary demand for recruiters as a function of emphasized issue. Conversely, recruiters emphasizing hours (vs. salary) will be more demanding on hours (their gain/non-gain issue), but there will be no difference in hours demand for candidates as a function of emphasized issue.

It is important to underscore that Hypotheses 2a and 2b make opposite predictions and so are in direct competition with one another. Hypothesis 2a suggests differences in demand on the *non-loss/loss issue* (and *not* the gain/non-gain issue) within a role as a function of emphasized issue. Hypothesis 2b states the direct opposite—differences in demand on the *gain/non-gain issue* (and *not* the non-loss/loss issue) within a role as a function of emphasized issue. The parenthetical clauses are critical; without them, Hypotheses 2a and 2b combine to form Hypothesis 1—a main effect of emphasized issue.

To test these three hypotheses, I measured participants' relative emphasized issue and assessed their demand on hours and on salary at three different points in the negotiation: participants reported their planned opening offers, their actual opening offers (if they were the one to open their negotiation), and their final negotiated outcomes.

*Frequency of Impasses*

I also hypothesized that the role by emphasized issue interaction would impact impasse rates. Because of their greater ability to make trade-offs (Bazerman et al., 1985; Froman & Cohen, 1970; Thompson, 2005), dyads with negotiators emphasizing different issues should be more likely to reach an agreement than dyads with negotiators emphasizing the same issue. Thus, I predicted that dyads with mixed issue emphases (i.e., candidate emphasizing hours and recruiter emphasizing salary; candidate emphasizing salary and recruiter emphasizing hours) would impasse less than dyads with the same issue emphasis (candidate and recruiter emphasizing hours; candidate and recruiter emphasizing salary).

Study 6 used a 2 (measured chronic regulatory focus: prevention vs. promotion) x 2 (assigned negotiator role: candidate vs. recruiter) between-participants design.

## Method

### *Participants*

Two hundred twenty students participated in return for \$8 compensation or 2 experimental credits. Data from one participant was excluded from all analyses because the participant did not complete the study. Therefore, there were 219 participants (126 women and 93 men) for the individual-level analyses. Data from an additional five participants was excluded from post-negotiation analyses: 1 participant was partnered with the excluded participant and 4 participants (2 dyads) did not follow instructions during the negotiation phase. For dyadic-level analyses, there were 214 participants (123 women and 91 men) or 107 dyads.

### *Procedure*



Participants arrived in response to flyers or were scheduled using an online sign-up system. In order to form negotiation dyads, two participants were run during each session. Participants signed a consent form and were told that we were running two short studies, a personality study and a negotiation study. Participants first completed “study 1,” which consisted of the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire.

The experimenter then explained that “study 2” was a negotiation study called “The Job.” Participants were randomly assigned to pairs and to roles (candidate or recruiter). The experimenter passed out the case information and the pre-negotiation questionnaires, allowing participants fifteen minutes to read and prepare. Participants were then paired with their randomly assigned partner and given 15 minutes to negotiate. Participants completed a final post-negotiation questionnaire before being compensated, debriefed, and thanked.

### *Materials*

#### *Regulatory Focus Questionnaire*

I again measured participants’ chronic regulatory focus with the RFQ (Higgins et al., 2001). In this study, promotion pride and prevention pride scores were uncorrelated,  $r(219) = .04, p = .5$ . To calculate participants’ predominant chronic regulatory focus, I first subtracted the prevention pride score ( $M = 3.47, SD = 0.79, \text{Cronbach's } \alpha = .78$ ) from the promotion pride score ( $M = 3.96, SD = 0.58, \text{Cronbach's } \alpha = .69$ ). Participants whose difference scores were greater than zero were identified as chronically promotion focus (151 participants) and participants whose difference scores were less than or equal to zero were identified as chronically prevention focus (68 participants). Analyses are based on this zero split on participants’ difference scores.

### *Case Information*

“The Job” is a simple two-issue negotiation that I wrote for this study. It is loosely based on existing cases, such as “New Recruit” written by Margaret Neale for the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg School of Management. In “The Job,” the candidate and the recruiter are negotiating over two issues: weekly hours (possible range: 40 to 80 hours per week) and yearly salary (possible range: \$20,000 to \$100,000 per year). Negotiators are told to negotiate over both issues, but the relative importance of each issue is left open to individual preference (see Appendix D for the full case information).

### *Pre-negotiation Questionnaire*

Participants filled out the pre-negotiation questionnaire after receiving the case information. The questionnaire was comprised of a battery of measures designed to assess participants’ pre-negotiation attitudes and strategies.

*Relative issue emphasis.* Two questions assessed how participants divided their attention between the two issues, weekly hours and yearly salary. Participants were asked to divide 100 points between the two issues to reflect their relative importance. Participants were also asked which issue was relatively more important (1 = *yearly salary* to 7 = *weekly hours*).

*Negotiator frame.* Four questions assessed how participants construed the upcoming negotiation. Participants were asked to rate the extent (1 = *absolutely not* to 7 = *absolutely yes*) to which they viewed the negotiation as a chance to create value, to minimize loss, to attain resources, and to maintain resources.

*Experienced role fit.* Four questions assessed participants' experience of fit or non-fit with their randomly assigned role. Participants were asked to rate to what extent (1 = *absolutely not* to 7 = *absolutely yes*) their roles were comfortable, felt like a good fit, were engaging, and felt right.

*Planned opening offer.* Participants were asked to indicate what their first offer would be if they were to open the negotiation. This question was free-response and advised participants that their response could mention hours, salary, or both.

#### *Post-negotiation Questionnaire*

Participants jointly completed the post-negotiation questionnaire at the conclusion of their negotiation. The questionnaire asked participants to record information about opening offers (i.e., who opened the negotiation and with what offer) and negotiated outcomes (i.e., was the outcome an impasse or agreement, what were the final offers or agreement amount). For questions on opening offer and agreement amount, participants could respond with hours, salary, or both.

## Results

### *Relative Issue Emphasis*

When forced to choose between the two issues, participants emphasized yearly salary more than weekly hours, as evidenced by one-sample t-tests,  $t(218) = -1.98, p = .05$  for the division of 100 points, and  $t(218) = -1.80, p = .07$  for the Likert-style rating measure. Because these two measures of issue importance were highly correlated,  $r(219) = .86, p < .001$ , their  $z$ -scores were averaged to create a measure of *relative issue importance*, with a higher value indicating a greater relative emphasis on salary (vs. hours).

To look at the relative importance the participants accorded the issues, I conducted a 2 (chronic regulatory focus: prevention vs. promotion) x 2 (role: candidate vs. recruiter) univariate analysis of variance with gender included as a covariate. There was a marginally significant effect of gender,  $F(1, 214) = 3.16, p = .08$ . The relative emphasis on salary versus hours was lower for women ( $M = -0.10, SD = 0.92$ ) than men ( $M = 0.13, SD = 1.01$ ). Role was also a significant predictor,  $F(1, 214) = 5.31, p = .02$ . The relative emphasis on salary versus hours was lower for recruiters ( $M = -0.17, SD = 0.98$ ) than for candidates ( $M = 0.17, SD = 0.92$ ). The interaction between regulatory focus and negotiator role was not significant,  $p > .5$ . Negotiators did not place greater relative emphasis on the issue that would create fit between their regulatory focus and role; I will discuss the implications for focus-role fit in multi-issue negotiations in the Discussion.

#### *Plan of Analysis*

In order to include relative issue emphasis in the following analyses of variance, I created an *emphasized issue* variable from a zero split on the relative issue importance variable. Emphasized issue was contrast coded (-1 = hours; +1 = salary). To assess how participants approached the negotiation, I conducted a series of 2 (chronic regulatory focus: prevention vs. promotion) x 2 (role: candidate vs. recruiter) x 2 (emphasized issue: hours vs. salary) univariate analyses of variance with gender included as a covariate.

#### *Negotiator Frame*

The ratings of minimize loss and maintain resources ( $r(219) = .35, p < .001$ ) were averaged to create a measure of *non-loss/loss framing*. Gender was significant,  $F(1, 210) = 4.27, p = .04$ . Women ( $M = 4.10, SD = 1.28$ ) approached the negotiation using a non-loss/loss frame more than men ( $M = 3.77, SD = 1.10$ ).

Most importantly, the interaction between role and emphasized issue was significant,  $F(1, 210) = 4.14, p = .04$ . As predicted, negotiators emphasizing the issue that represented a non-loss/loss for them approached the negotiation using a non-loss/loss frame. As shown in Figure 14, candidates emphasizing hours ( $M = 3.95, SD = 1.40$ ) adopted more of a loss/non-loss frame than candidates emphasizing salary ( $M = 3.77, SD = 1.16$ ), whereas recruiters emphasizing salary ( $M = 4.27, SD = 1.02$ ) adopted more of a loss/non-loss frame than recruiters emphasizing hours ( $M = 3.96, SD = 1.22$ ). Planned contrast tests indicated that the difference in means were in the predicted directions but non-significant for candidates,  $t(215) = -0.79, p > .2$ , or recruiters,  $t(215) = 1.33, p > .15$ .

The ratings of create value and attain resources ( $r(219) = .57, p < .001$ ) were averaged to create a measure of *gain/non-gain framing*. Counter to my hypothesis, the interaction between role and emphasized issue was not significant,  $p > .5$ . An emphasis on the gain/non-gain issue did not prompt a gain/non-gain frame. I will explore possible reasons for this in the Discussion.

#### *Experienced Role Fit*

Because the measures assessing participants' feelings about their assigned role (role comfort, fit, engagement, and rightness) were highly intercorrelated (Cronbach's  $\alpha = .92$ ), I created a measure of *experienced role fit* by averaging the four ratings.

The interaction between regulatory focus and emphasized issue was marginally significant,  $F(1, 209) = 3.61, p = .06$ . Prevention participants emphasizing hours ( $M = 4.67, SD = 1.56$ ) reported experiencing greater fit than prevention participants emphasizing salary ( $M = 4.14, SD = 1.08$ ), whereas promotion participants emphasizing salary ( $M = 4.47, SD = 1.06$ ) reported experiencing greater fit than promotion

participants emphasizing hours ( $M = 4.40$ ,  $SD = 1.45$ ). Because neither issue is framed one way versus another independently of role, it is not clear why an interaction between regulatory focus and emphasized issue would impact experienced role fit.

The three-way interaction between negotiator role, regulatory focus, and focal issue was not significant,  $p > .2$ . Negotiators whose focal issue created a shared strategic preference between their regulatory focus and role did not experience greater fit. I will discuss the implications for focus-role fit in multi-issue negotiations in the Discussion.

### *Planned Opening Offer*

#### *Plan of Analysis for Measures of Demand*

For the individual measures of demand in this negotiation (planned opening offer and actual opening offer), participants could respond in terms of hours, salary, or both. Therefore, the number of participants in each analysis differed. I conducted a series of independent samples t-tests to ensure that there were no differences between participants who: 1) provided an answer for hours (vs. not), or 2) provided an answer for salary (vs. not). There were no differences with the exception that participants who provided a planned opening offer for hours (vs. not) reported a greater hours emphasis and lower planned salary demand. Similarly, participants who provided an actual opening offer for hours (vs. not) reported a greater hours emphasis (see Appendix E for the full analysis).

To look at the effects on demand of the interaction of role and issue emphasized, I conducted a series of 2 (role: candidate vs. recruiter) x 2 (issue emphasized: hours vs. salary) univariate analyses of variance with gender included as a covariate.<sup>9</sup> I explored

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<sup>9</sup> Regulatory focus and its interactions (Regulatory Focus x Role, Regulatory Focus x Emphasized Issue, and Regulatory Focus x Role x Emphasized Issue) did not produce consistently significant results for the demand analyses. Moreover, regulatory focus and its interactions did not change the pattern of results and were therefore excluded.

demand both in terms of hours and in terms of salary. I standardized demand on hours separately for candidates and recruiters and reversed the sign for candidates. I standardized demand on salary separately for candidates and recruiters and reversed the sign for recruiters. Therefore, for all measures, *higher values indicate a more demanding planned opening offer* than others in the same role.

#### *Planned Opening Offer for Hours*

One hundred eighty-one participants provided a planned opening offer for hours. In support of Hypothesis 1, the main effect of issue emphasized was significant,  $F(1, 176) = 3.96, p = .05$ . Participants emphasizing hours ( $M = 0.13, SD = 0.95$ ) reported greater planned demand on hours than participants emphasizing salary ( $M = -0.18, SD = 1.03$ ).

The Role x Issue Emphasis interaction was significant,  $F(1, 176) = 6.28, p = .01$ . As shown in Figure 15a, candidates emphasizing hours ( $M = 0.34, SD = 0.82$ ) reported greater planned demand on hours than candidates emphasizing salary ( $M = -0.34, SD = 1.06$ ), whereas, if anything, the opposite was true for recruiters (i.e., recruiters emphasizing hours ( $M = -0.03, SD = 1.02$ ) reported slightly less planned demand on hours than recruiters emphasizing salary ( $M = 0.05, SD = 0.97$ )). Planned contrast tests showed that the difference in means for planned demand between candidates emphasizing hours versus candidates emphasizing salary was highly significant,  $t(177) = -3.30, p = .001$ , whereas the difference in means for recruiters was *not* significant,  $t(177) = 0.35, p > .5$ .

Hypothesis 2a stated that negotiators will be more demanding on their emphasized issue when that issue represents a *non-loss/loss* for them. Candidates

emphasizing hours, which is their non-loss/loss issue, should plan to be more demanding on hours than candidates emphasizing salary, which is not their non-loss/loss issue, whereas this should not be the case for recruiters given that hours is *not* their loss/non-loss issue. These results, then, support Hypothesis 2a.

#### *Planned Opening Offer for Salary*

One hundred seventy-nine participants provided a planned opening offer for salary. The main effect of emphasized issue was a non-significant trend,  $F(1, 174) = 2.29$ ,  $p = .13$ , indicating weak support of Hypothesis 1. Participants emphasizing salary ( $M = 0.11$ ,  $SD = 1.05$ ) tended to express greater planned demand on salary than participants emphasizing hours ( $M = -0.11$ ,  $SD = 0.94$ ).

The Role x Issue Emphasis interaction was significant,  $F(1, 174) = 4.66$ ,  $p = .03$ . As shown in Figure 15b, recruiters emphasizing salary ( $M = 0.33$ ,  $SD = 1.02$ ) reported greater planned demand on salary than recruiters emphasizing hours ( $M = -0.22$ ,  $SD = 0.93$ ), whereas, if anything, the opposite was true for candidates (i.e., candidates emphasizing salary reported slightly less planned demand on salary ( $M = -0.04$ ,  $SD = 1.05$ ) than candidates emphasizing hours ( $M = 0.05$ ,  $SD = 0.95$ )). Planned contrast tests showed that the difference in means for planned demand between recruiters emphasizing salary versus recruiters emphasizing hours *was* significant,  $t(175) = 2.60$ ,  $p = .01$ , whereas the difference in means for candidates *was not* significant,  $t(175) = -0.45$ ,  $p > .5$ .

Once again, Hypothesis 2a stated that negotiators will be more demanding on their emphasized issue when that issue represents a *non-loss/loss* for them. Recruiters emphasizing salary, which is their non-loss/loss issue, should plan to be more demanding on salary than recruiters emphasizing hours, which is not their non-loss/loss issue,



whereas this should not be the case for candidates given that salary is *not* their loss/non-loss issue. These results again support Hypothesis 2a.

#### *Mixed Model Analysis of Planned Opening Offer*

To test my three hypotheses on planned opening offer across planned opening offer issue (i.e., offer for hours and offer for salary), I used a mixed model. I created a new within-subjects dependent variable, planned opening offer. I then created contrasts to test my hypotheses: a main effect of issue emphasis (Hypothesis 1), differences in demand on the *non-loss/loss issue* within a role as a function of emphasized issue (Hypothesis 2a), differences in demand on the *gain/non-gain issue* within a role as a function of emphasized issue (Hypothesis 2b). To create a fully specified model, I also included contrast-coded variables testing for a main effect of role, a main effect of planned opening offer issue, an interaction of role and planned opening offer issue, and a full cross-over interaction between role, emphasized issue, and planned opening offer issue.

The results supported Hypothesis 2a,  $F(1, 351.9) = 17.36, p < .001$ . Hypotheses 1 and 2b were not supported,  $ps > .5$ . These results confirm those of the separate univariate analyses of variance (see again Figure 15). As predicted by Hypothesis 2a, for each offer issue, there was a significant difference in level of demand as a function of emphasized issue for the negotiators for whom the issue was a non-loss/loss, but not for the negotiators for whom the issue was a gain/non-gain. Specifically, for demand on hours, candidates emphasizing hours were significantly more demanding than candidates emphasizing salary whereas the difference within recruiters as a function of emphasized issue was not significant. For salary, the converse was true—recruiters emphasizing

salary were significantly more demanding than recruiters emphasizing hours whereas the difference within candidates as a function of emphasized issue was not significant.

### *Opening Offer*

#### *Calculating Opening Offer*

One hundred two dyads provided data on the opening offers in their negotiation. As mentioned above, I analyzed demand for both hours and salary. The opening offers were separately standardized for candidates and recruiters with the signs appropriately reversed. For both measures, *higher values indicate a more demanding actual opening offer* than others in the same role.

#### *Opening Offer for Hours*

Ninety-seven participants who opened their negotiation provided an opening offer for hours. The main effect of emphasized issue was not significant ( $p > .15$ ) indicating that Hypothesis 1 was not supported. The Role x Emphasized Issue interaction was a non-significant trend,  $F(1, 92) = 2.45, p = .12$ . As shown in Figure 16a, candidates emphasizing hours ( $M = 0.38, SD = 0.74$ ) tended to open with more demanding offers for hours than candidates emphasizing salary ( $M = -0.33, SD = 1.09$ ), whereas, if anything, the opposite was true for recruiters (i.e., recruiters emphasizing hours ( $M = -0.01, SD = 0.98$ ) tended to open with slightly less demanding offers for hours than recruiters emphasizing salary ( $M = 0.04, SD = 1.23$ )). As predicted, planned contrast tests showed that the difference in means between candidates emphasizing hours versus candidates emphasizing salary *was* significant,  $t(93) = -2.09, p = .04$ , and the difference in means for recruiters was *not* significant,  $t(93) = 0.21, p > .5$ .

As discussed for planned opening offer for hours, Hypothesis 2a stated that negotiators will be more demanding on their emphasized issue when that issue represents a *non-loss/loss* for them. Candidates emphasizing hours, which is their non-loss/loss issue, should be more demanding on hours than candidates emphasizing salary, which is not their non-loss/loss issue, whereas this should not be the case for recruiters given that hours is *not* their loss/non-loss issue. These results, then, additionally support Hypothesis 2a.

#### *Opening Offer for Salary*

Eighty-six participants who opened their negotiation provided an opening offer for salary. The main effect of emphasized issue was a non-significant trend,  $F(1, 81) = 2.08, p = .15$ , providing weak support for Hypothesis 1. Participants emphasizing salary ( $M = 0.26, SD = 0.98$ ) tended to open with more demanding opening offers for salary than participants emphasizing hours ( $M = -0.19, SD = 1.02$ ).

The Role x Emphasized Issue interaction was significant,  $F(1, 81) = 4.38, p = .04$ . As shown in Figure 16b, recruiters emphasizing salary ( $M = 0.51, SD = 1.00$ ) opened with more demanding offers for salary than recruiters emphasizing hours ( $M = -0.28, SD = 0.95$ ), whereas, if anything, the opposite was true to candidates (i.e., candidates emphasizing salary ( $M = -0.09, SD = 0.87$ ) opened with slightly less demanding offers for salary than candidates emphasizing hours ( $M = 0.02, SD = 1.17$ )). Planned contrast tests showed that the difference in means between recruiters emphasizing hours versus recruiters emphasizing salary was highly significant,  $t(82) = 2.92, p = .005$ , whereas the difference in means for candidates was *not* significant,  $t(82) = -0.31, p > .5$ .

As discussed for planned opening offer for salary, Hypothesis 2a stated that negotiators will be more demanding on their emphasized issue when that issue represents a *non-loss/loss* for them. Recruiters emphasizing salary, which is their non-loss/loss issue, should be more demanding on salary than recruiters emphasizing hours, which is not their non-loss/loss issue, whereas this should not be the case for candidates given that salary is *not* their loss/non-loss issue. These results further support Hypothesis 2a.

#### *Mixed Model Analysis of Opening Offer*

To test my three hypotheses on opening offer across opening offer issue (i.e., offer for hours and offer for salary), I used the same mixed model described for planned opening offer issue. I created a new within-subjects dependent variable, opening offer. The contrasts included were: a main effect of emphasized issue (Hypothesis 1), differences in demand on the *non-loss/loss issue* within a role as a function of emphasized issue (Hypothesis 2a), differences in demand on the *gain/non-gain issue* within a role as a function of emphasized issue (Hypothesis 2b), a main effect of role, a main effect of opening offer issue, an interaction of role and opening offer issue, and a full cross-over interaction between role, emphasized issue, and opening offer issue.

The results again supported Hypothesis 2a,  $F(1, 175.0) = 11.98, p = .001$ . Hypotheses 1 and 2b were not supported,  $ps > .5$ . These results confirm those of the separate univariate analyses of variance (see again Figure 16). As predicted by Hypothesis 2a, for each offer issue, there was a significant difference in level of demand by emphasized issue for the negotiators for whom the issue was a non-loss/loss, but not for the negotiators for whom the issue was a gain/non-gain. Specifically, for demand on hours, candidates emphasizing hours were significantly more demanding than candidates

emphasizing salary whereas the difference within recruiters as a function of emphasized issue was not significant. For salary, the converse was true—recruiters emphasizing salary were significantly more demanding than recruiters emphasizing hours whereas the difference within candidates as a function of emphasized issue was not significant.

### *Frequency of Impasse*

To look at outcome measures, I used dyads rather than individual negotiators as the unit of analysis. One hundred seven dyads negotiated to an outcome; of these, 20 (19%) reached an impasse. The outcome type variable was contrast coded (agreement = -1; impasse = +1). I ran a binary logistic regression with outcome type as the dependent variable and candidate emphasized issue (contrast coded: hours = -1; salary = +1), recruiter emphasized issue (contrast coded: hours = -1; salary = +1), and Candidate Emphasized Issue x Recruiter Emphasized Issue as the independent variables. The interaction between candidate emphasized issue and recruiter emphasized issue was not significant,  $p > .5$ . My hypothesis that dyads with negotiators emphasizing opposite issues would impasse less often than dyads with negotiators emphasizing the same issue was not confirmed. I will explore possible reasons for this in the Discussion.

### *Agreement Amount*

In their negotiations, 87 dyads reached an agreement ( $M_s = \$64,000$  and 56 hours, <sup>10</sup>  $SD_s = \$11,000$  and 9 hours, range = \$38,000 – \$90,000 and 40 – 80 hours). Because the agreement is at the dyadic level, I was unable to perform the same transformation as on other measures of demand. Therefore, for the agreement measures, more hours represent a worse outcome for candidates, but a better outcome for recruiters.

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<sup>10</sup> Salary is rounded to the nearest thousand and hours are rounded to the nearest hour to accurately reflect the level of precision used by participants.

Conversely, higher salary represents a better outcome for candidates, but a worse outcome for recruiters. I conducted a series of 2 (candidate emphasized issue: hours vs. salary) x 2 (recruiter emphasized issue: hours vs. salary) univariate analyses of variance.

#### *Agreement for Hours*

Recruiter emphasized issue was not significant ( $p > .2$ ), indicating that Hypothesis 2b was not supported. As predicted by Hypothesis 2a, however, the main effect of candidate emphasized issue was significant,  $F(1, 82) = 12.04, p = .001$ . Candidates emphasizing hours reached a better outcome on hours (i.e., fewer hours) ( $M = 53, SD = 9$ ) than candidates emphasizing salary ( $M = 59, SD = 8$ ), as shown in Figure 17a.

#### *Agreement for Salary*

Candidate emphasized issue was not significant ( $p > .2$ ), indicating that Hypothesis 2b was not supported. As predicted by Hypothesis 2a, however, the main effect of recruiter emphasized issue was significant,  $F(1, 82) = 4.90, p = .03$ . Recruiters emphasizing salary reached a better outcome for salary (i.e., lower salary) ( $M = \$61,000, SD = \$11,000$ ) than recruiters emphasizing hours ( $M = \$67,000, SD = \$10,000$ ), as shown in Figure 17b.

### Discussion

Study 6 did not find support for my secondary hypothesis. Negotiators did not emphasize the issue which would create a strategic commonality between their chronic regulatory focus and assigned role. Negotiators who did emphasize this issue did not experience greater fit. Given the choice of issues to emphasize, negotiators may not have realized (consciously or subconsciously) that one issue versus another translated to a fit for their chronic regulatory focus *and* assigned role. However, I do not think that this

precludes focus-role fit in multi-issue negotiations. To test the possibility of fit in multi-issue negotiations, a future study should measure chronic regulatory focus and then assign participants to both a role and an explicit issue emphasis. In this case, I would expect effects of fit for prevention candidates emphasizing hours, promotion candidates emphasizing salary, prevention recruiters emphasizing salary, and promotion recruiters emphasizing hours. While negotiators did not intuitively select the issue that would create fit for them in this study, they may experience fit when the issue is selected for them and the strategic commonalities with their chronic regulatory focus are highlighted.

My prediction that dyads with negotiators emphasizing different issues would be more likely to reach agreement was also not supported. Negotiators may not have realized that their rankings of issue importance differed and/or may not have discovered their ability to make trade-offs on these issues. This is consistent with past research indicating that negotiators often overlook such possibilities despite the obvious mutual benefits (Carroll, Bazerman, & Maury, 1988; Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Thompson, 2005; Thompson & Hastie, 1990; Thompson & Hrebec, 1996).

More importantly, Study 6 confirmed the importance of role in negotiation. Even in a negotiation with roles other than buyer and seller and with more than one negotiable issue, role was essential. Role determined the meaning of each issue and interacted with issue emphasis to impact negotiation approach and outcomes. Negotiators emphasizing the issue that represented a non-loss/loss for them (candidates emphasizing hours and recruiters emphasizing salary) approached the negotiation with more of a non-loss/loss frame than negotiators emphasizing their gain/non-gain issue (candidates emphasizing salary and recruiters emphasizing hours). However, negotiators emphasizing their

gain/non-gain issue did not adopt a gain/non-gain frame as compared to negotiators emphasizing their non-loss/loss issue. I will discuss possible reasons for this below in conjunction with my discussion of the demand and outcome results.

Consistent with the results for negotiator frame, across measures, Hypothesis 2a was supported (meaning that the competing Hypotheses 2b was necessarily not supported): negotiators emphasizing their non-loss/loss issue had more demanding planned and actual opening offers *on that issue* than negotiators emphasizing their gain/non-gain issue (candidates emphasizing hours were more demanding on hours than candidates emphasizing salary; recruiters emphasizing salary were more demanding on salary than recruiters emphasizing hours). Additionally, negotiators emphasizing their non-loss/loss issue reached better outcomes *on that issue* than negotiators emphasizing their gain/non-gain issue (candidates emphasizing hours reached agreements for fewer hours than candidates emphasizing salary; recruiters emphasizing salary reached agreements for lower salaries than recruiters emphasizing hours). There were no significant differences on gain/non-gain issue demand or outcome within a role as a function of emphasized issue.

To reiterate, differences in gain/non-gain frame and demand on the gain/non-gain issues by role as a function of emphasized issue were not significant, whereas differences in non-loss/loss frame and demand on the non-loss/loss issues by role as a function of emphasized issue were consistently significant. There is a large literature on the overweighting of negatives relative to positives, in domains from person perception (e.g., Fiske, 1980) to general information evaluation (e.g., Peeters & Czapinski, 1990). Decision-making research, at least since the advent of prospect theory (Kahneman &



Tversky, 1979), has particularly latched onto the tenet that losses loom larger than equivalent gains (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991; Northcraft, Neale, Tenbrunsel, & Thomas, 1996; Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).

However, the results of Study 6 are not a direct replication of losses looming larger than gains.<sup>11</sup> When presented with an opportunity to minimize loss *and* an opportunity to maximize gain, negotiators were not more demanding on their non-loss/loss issue. (There was no main effect of role.) Rather, negotiators emphasizing their non-loss/loss issue were more non-loss/loss framed and were more demanding on this issue. The equivalent differences for gain/non-gain issue were not significant. In this study, we do not see a main effect of losses looming larger than gains.

Nonetheless asymmetric weighting of losses and gains may explain why Hypothesis 2a was supported while Hypotheses 1 and 2b were not. Across roles, an emphasis on the non-loss/loss issue (vs. the gain/non-gain issue) was sufficient to create a non-loss/loss frame of the negotiation situation. However, an emphasis on the gain/non-gain issue (vs. the non-loss/loss issue) was not sufficient to create a gain/non-gain frame of the negotiation situation. Because this is true for both candidates and recruiters, it is not an effect of the specific issue—it is not the case that the hours issue or the salary issue had a more powerful effect on negotiators. Instead, given that losses are psychologically more powerful than gains (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), the non-loss/loss issue (whether hours or salary) may have resonated with negotiators more than the gain/non-gain issue (whether hours or salary).

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<sup>11</sup> Unfortunately, negotiators provided information on their relative weighting of the two issues rather than their absolute weighting of each issue. Thus, I cannot determine whether the main effect of role on issue emphasis is an effect of the gain/non-gain issue, the non-loss/loss issue, or both.

Consequently, an emphasis on the non-loss/loss issue may have been more psychologically meaningful than an emphasis on the gain/non-gain issue. Therefore, an emphasis on the non-loss/loss issue may have been psychologically sufficient to alter negotiator behavior (i.e., to produce non-loss/loss framing, greater planned and actual demand on the non-loss/loss issue, and better outcomes on the non-loss/loss issue) whereas an emphasis on the gain/non-gain issue may have been psychologically insufficient to alter negotiator behavior. Hypothesis 2a may have been supported because of the greater psychological impact of losses versus gains on negotiators.

A follow-up study could test this proposition. In the current study, participants were asked how they framed the overall negotiation. A more informative set of measures would ask participants, not whether they construe the negotiation situation as non-loss/loss or gain/non-gain, but the extent to which they are concerned about losing or not losing hours/salary and gaining or not gaining hours/salary. These measures of concern for realizing non-losses/losses and gains/non-gains could answer whether participants indeed weighed losses more than gains. Concern for non-losses/losses should correlate with demand on the non-loss/loss issue—participants who are deeply concerned with non-losses/losses should be more demanding on this issue to ensure success in avoiding losses. Thus, I would expect concern for non-losses/losses to mediate the effect of the interaction of role and emphasized issue on demand on the non-loss/loss issue. Such a follow-up study could confirm whether asymmetric weighting of gains and losses is in fact the mechanism underlying the results of Study 6.

Study 6 was an important investigation of role in a multi-issue negotiation with roles other than buyer and seller. In Study 6, emphasized issue impacted frame, planned

demand, actual demand, and negotiated outcome, but it did so only through an interaction with role. Role dictates the meaning of the emphasized issue, determining whether it represents a non-loss/loss or a gain/non-gain to the negotiator. Study 6 highlights the general significance of negotiator role. The previous five studies demonstrated the importance of role in single-issue negotiations between buyers and sellers. Study 6 found, for the first time, effects of role in a multi-issue negotiation between recruiters and candidates.

## GENERAL DISCUSSION

### Summary of Results

The present studies examined the impact of role in negotiation. The first five studies looked, for the first time, at how role combines with regulatory focus to create focus-role fit. Not only is this the first examination of regulatory fit in a negotiation setting, it is also an investigation of a new type of fit. Traditional models of regulatory fit find a match between a goal orientation and a strategy of goal pursuit (Higgins, 2000). The present research finds regulatory fit between two goal orientations with shared strategic preferences. Specifically, the first five studies investigated focus-role fit—a fit between regulatory focus and negotiator role due to their strategic commonalities. In price negotiations, prevention buyers (shared vigilant strategy preference) and promotion sellers (shared eager strategy preference) are in focus-role fit.

In Study 1, prevention buyers and promotion sellers (focus-role fit) were more demanding in the price(s) they thought right than promotion buyers and prevention sellers (non-fit). In Study 2, I found evidence for my assumption that buyers and sellers adopt different frames of the negotiation. In a price negotiation, buyers approached the

negotiation in terms of non-losses and losses whereas sellers approached the same negotiation in terms of gains and non-gains. Study 2 also found that negotiators subjectively experience focus-role fit; negotiators rated their randomly assigned roles as a better fit when their chronic regulatory orientation matched their roles (i.e., when they were in focus-role fit). Additionally, Study 2 replicated focus-role fit effects on demand in a real, binding negotiation. Prevention buyers and promotion sellers (focus-role fit) had more demanding opening offers than promotion buyers and prevention sellers (non-fit). Although there were no effects of focus-role fit on agreement amount, dyads where both members were in focus-role fit were more likely to reach an impasse, compared to other dyadic combinations. Studies 1 and 2 established focus-role fit in price negotiations.

Studies 3 and 4 revealed the mechanics of focus-role fit. Study 3 tested a moderator of fit to establish how focus-role fit impacts negotiator responses. Negotiators with a low assessment orientation demonstrated the established patterns of price negotiation focus-role fit effects—intensified responses. Specifically, prevention buyers and promotion sellers (focus-role fit) reported more positive evaluations of their pre-negotiation position than promotion buyers and prevention sellers (non-fit). High assessment negotiators showed the opposite pattern. Prevention buyers and promotion sellers (fit) reported *less* positive evaluations of their pre-negotiation position than promotion buyers and prevention sellers (non-fit). High assessors concerned with *doing* right over *feeling* right overcorrected the bias in their responses due to focus-role fit. This pattern of results suggests that focus-role fit intensifies responses through the accompanying feeling right experience.

Study 4 investigated an earlier step in the focus-role fit model. By manipulating strategy in a price negotiation, Study 4 tested whether shared strategic preferences were in fact the commonality linking regulatory focus and negotiator role. First, Study 4 replicated the effect of role assignment on negotiator frame—buyers adopted a non-loss/loss frame and sellers adopted a gain/non-gain frame. Second, Study 4 found effects of focus-strategy fit and role-strategy fit. Vigilant prevention negotiators and eager promotion negotiators (focus-strategy fit) experienced more fit than eager prevention negotiators and vigilant promotion negotiators (focus-strategy non-fit). Similarly, vigilant buyers and eager sellers (role-strategy fit) experienced more fit than eager buyers and vigilant sellers (role-strategy non-fit). Focus-role fit was eliminated when strategy was assigned. The results of Study 4 supported the hypothesis that focus-role fit is due to the naturally occurring strategic complementarities between regulatory focus and negotiator role. Furthermore, for negotiators experiencing relatively more fit, focus-strategy fit and role-strategy fit predicted planned demand. Experienced role fit mediated the relationship between focus-strategy fit and demand and role-strategy and demand. These findings provide convergent evidence with Study 3 that fit affects responses through the feeling right experience.

Studies 5 and 6 moved beyond price negotiations. Study 5 showed, for the first time, a reversal in the effect of role on negotiator frame. The negotiation was not about price, but rather about information. The buyer was directed to obtain information, which the seller was directed not to reveal. Buyers approached this negotiation with a gain/non-gain frame whereas sellers approached this negotiation with a non-loss/loss frame. Although some of the design limitations did not allow for a clean test of a focus-role fit

reversal, Study 5 importantly demonstrated that role is not fixed to negotiator frame. Rather, role predicts frame based on the emphasized issue of the negotiation (i.e., what the negotiation is about).

The first five studies traced the process by which focus-role fit is created and impacts negotiation outcomes. Assignment to the buyer or sell role determines negotiator frame, depending on what the negotiation is about (e.g., price, information). Negotiator frame, in turn, leads to a preference for a vigilant or eager strategy. This strategy may match (or mismatch) the negotiator's chronic regulatory focus to create focus-role fit (or non-fit). Negotiators in focus-role fit (in a price negotiation, prevention buyers and promotion sellers) have a subjective feeling of rightness about their responses to the upcoming negotiation and this leads to an intensification of these responses. In particular, negotiators in fit report greater planned demand and open with more demanding offers in the negotiation. When two focus-role fit negotiators are paired, their high levels of demand result in higher impasse rates.

Study 6 built on the previous studies' findings regarding the importance of role and emphasized issue. The first five studies demonstrated clearly the importance of role in predicting negotiator frame in single-issue negotiations, and in predicting focus-role fit in single-issue price negotiations. Study 6 used a two-issue negotiation between candidate and recruiter to look at the impact of role on negotiation more broadly. Study 6 found that, when negotiators are faced with two issues, role and emphasized issue interact. Role defines the situation by dictating the framing of the issue(s) under negotiation. Negotiators emphasizing their non-loss/loss issue approached the negotiation using non-loss/loss frames more than negotiators emphasizing their gain/non-gain issue. Negotiators

emphasizing their non-loss/loss issue (vs. negotiators emphasizing their gain/non-gain issue) were more demanding on their non-loss/loss issue and reached better negotiated outcomes on their non-loss/loss issue. Study 6 provided evidence that role assignment is an important factor in negotiations with more than one issue and with roles other than buyer and seller. The six studies together underscore the significance of role assignment across classes of negotiations.

#### Notes, Limitations, and Strengths

In three studies, gender had an effect on negotiation preparation. The pattern of results indicated that men approached the negotiation using gain/non-gain frames more (Studies 4 & 5) and non-loss/loss frames less (Studies 4 & 6) than women. Men also reported a greater role fit experience and were more demanding than women (Studies 4 & 5). These results are consistent with previous research on gender and negotiation indicating that women are less comfortable with and less demanding in negotiations (e.g., Babcock & Laschever, 2003). However, significance levels varied and gender was not a significant predictor for any measure across these three studies. Furthermore, two samples did not show gender effects at all. While it would be preferable not to see any gender differences, perhaps the mixed pattern of results indicates that not all women are affected and most women are not affected on all aspects of their approach to negotiation.

These studies are not without limitations. I did not find focus-role fit effects on agreement amount. This may be due in part to the small sizes of the samples for dyadic analyses, especially for analyses testing a 2 x 2 interaction. It is instructive to note that, Study 6, which found outcome effects for the role by emphasized issue interaction, had

more than twice as many dyads. Larger sample sizes may allow focus-role fit effects on agreement amount to emerge.

In addition, regulatory focus is an orientation system with multiple facets. Prevention focus and promotion focus differ, for example, in their emphasis on safety and responsibility versus hopes and accomplishments, their representation of goals as oughts versus ideals, and their concern for maintenance versus attainment (Higgins, 1997). While these components are related, different dimensions of the system may be active in different situations. In negotiation, the differences in concern for non-losses and losses versus gains and non-gains (and the ensuing strategic preferences for vigilance versus eagerness) may be most important. Measuring (or manipulating) this facet of regulatory focus more targetedly may produce stronger effects of focus-role fit.

A major strength of this program of research is its use of different negotiation scenarios. Across negotiations, whether hypothetical or real, emphasizing price or another issue, single-issue or multi-issue, between buyer and seller or candidate and recruiter, role mattered. The use of real negotiations with binding outcomes is, in fact, a methodological contribution to the field of negotiation research, which overwhelmingly uses hypothetical scenarios. Real, binding negotiations have several strengths, as discussed in conjunction with Study 2. They are incentive-compatible (ensuring that participants behave in line with their true preferences), they are simple and easy to understand, they are easily manipulated to suit the researcher's needs, and they have greater external validity.

#### Focus-Role Fit



These studies are the first to test for regulatory fit effects in negotiation. Monga and Zhu (2005) tested the effect of prevention- and promotion-related outcome framing on the intensity of negative and positive outcomes for buyers versus sellers. Their starting assumption was that, when approaching a monetary transaction, buyers are relatively prevention-focused and sellers are relatively promotion-focused. I agree that, when a negotiation is about price, the role of buyer fits a prevention focus and the role of seller fits a promotion focus, but this does not mean that buyers as individuals have a prevention focus personality and sellers as individuals have a promotion focus personality. Instead, both buyers and sellers as individuals themselves vary in their chronic regulatory focus, and this determines whether there is regulatory fit or not with their assigned role. Monga and Zhu's results may, nevertheless, have implications for momentary regulatory focus in negotiations, specifically for the feasibility of situational inductions of regulatory focus separate from role assignment. However, this is a question for future research.

The present studies suggest that, when a negotiation is about price, regulatory fit increases negotiator demand, which has potential ramifications for the entire negotiation process from planning to outcome (Barry & Friedman, 1998; Donohue, 1981; Galinsky et al., 2005; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Galinsky et al., 2002; Huber & Neale, 1986, 1987; Van Poucke & Buelens, 2002; White & Neale, 1994). The emphasis of the negotiation (whether price or another issue) can be manipulated. Because it is typically easier to modify the situation or circumstances surrounding a negotiation (both prior to and during the negotiation) rather than selecting for, never mind changing, the personalities of the negotiators, investigating the effects of situational inductions of

regulatory fit (e.g., Freitas & Higgins, 2002) and of manipulations of a negotiation's emphasis is important practically as well as theoretically. When one recognizes that cross-organizational and cross-cultural differences involve institutionalized versions of such situational inductions, the practical significance of such research is even more apparent.

### Negotiator Role

The negotiation literature dealing with roles has looked at the superior performance of buyers (Bazerman et al., 1985; Huber & Neale, 1986; Van Poucke & Buelens, 2002), the greater fixed-sum errors of buyers in integrative negotiations (Drake, 2001), reference-price setting by buyers (Kristensen & Gärling, 1997a), the greater importance of perspective taking in buyers (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008), and the greater importance of sellers to the negotiation process (Schei et al., 2006; Weingart et al., 1990). My studies, in contrast, examined how assignment to one role or the other impacts negotiator frame, fit, demand, and outcomes.

Across negotiations, role assignment had significant effects on negotiators, regardless of the extent of the role assignment. In the notebook negotiations, participants were simply informed of their roles without any additional information or instructions. In Synertech-Dosagen, Bullard Houses, and The Job, participants received some information about the goals of their position. Irrespective of the amount of role information, role was the only significant predictor of negotiator frame in negotiations emphasizing a single issue (Studies 2, 4 & 5). Neither chronic regulatory focus nor manipulated strategy predicted negotiator frame. *Role alone predicted negotiator frame.* Role interacted with chronic regulatory focus (Studies 1-3) and manipulated strategy

(Study 4) to create fit. Fit, in turn, created a subjective feeling of fit (Studies 2 & 4), which intensified responses, such as preparatory responses (Study 3), planned demand (Studies 1 & 4), and actual demand (Study 2). Greater actual demand led to higher impasse rates when two fit negotiators were paired (Study 2). Role interacted with emphasized issue to predict frame, demand, and outcomes—negotiators emphasizing their non-loss/loss issue (vs. negotiators emphasizing their gain/non-gain issue) were more non-loss/loss framed, planned to be and were more demanding on their non-loss/loss issue, and negotiated better outcomes on their non-loss/loss issue (Study 6). Role is clearly a major factor in negotiations.

In the final study, role interacted with emphasized issue to influence demand and outcomes for each negotiator's non-loss/loss issue. An emphasis on the non-loss/loss issue translated to greater demand and better outcomes *on this issue*. Notably, an emphasis on the non-loss/loss issue proved to be the best approach to the negotiation—the only significant differences in negotiated outcomes were better outcomes on the non-loss/loss issue for negotiators emphasizing that issue. These results suggest that manipulating negotiators' emphasized issue can have major consequences. When the non-loss/loss issue is actually more important, instructing negotiators to emphasize this issue may yield better outcomes. Furthermore, framing of most issues is malleable, as evidenced by research manipulating frame through the provision of different reference points (Bazerman et al., 1985; De Dreu et al., 1994; De Dreu & McCusker, 1997; Neale & Bazerman, 1985; Sondak et al., 1995). If a given issue is more important, a better outcome may be attained if the issue is strategically reframed to represent a non-loss/loss rather than a gain/non-gain. Given the power of reference prices (Blount et al., 1996;

Carmon & Ariely, 2000; Galinsky et al., 2002; Huber & Neale, 1986, 1987; Kahneman, 1992; Kristensen & Gärling, 1997a & b; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Van Poucke & Buelens, 2002; White & Neale, 1994), this may be an effective manipulation.

I began with two questions: how does role impact negotiation and why are some people better buyers or sellers? The six studies presented here begin to answer those questions. By determining the meaning of the issue(s) under negotiation, role impacts negotiation through its definition of the situation. Role then interacts with other variables (i.e., regulatory focus, strategy, or emphasized issue) to further impact negotiation. People have different negotiation experiences and outcomes in different roles because of the manner in which their chronic regulatory focus or chosen emphasized issue interacts with their role to impact negotiator frame, experienced fit, demand, and outcomes.

#### Future Directions

In the present studies, whether it was relatively prescribed (in the case of buyer or seller) or open to interpretation (in the case of candidate or recruiter), role had consequences. Across studies, role defined the situation for the negotiator and this definition of the situation impacted how the negotiator moved forward. This is consistent with the tenets of symbolic interactionism that behavior is a result of an interaction between the individual and the social environment, as defined by the role (e.g., Blumer, 1969; Goffman, 1959; Mead, 1934; Stryker & Statham, 1985). The negotiation experience differed meaningfully in terms of frame, fit, demand, and outcomes based on negotiators' assigned role. Role matters!

The present studies are an initial exploration of the importance of focus-role fit and role. The negotiation cases used in the present research were one-shot negotiations

that emphasized utility concerns over relational concerns. Further, Studies 1-5 were single-issue distributive negotiations. For these reasons, the dominant response for negotiators was one of demand. An important future direction will be to explore how focus-role fit impacts negotiations that are integrative (i.e., the negotiation pie can be not only divided, but also expanded) and/or repeated (i.e., the negotiators will negotiate together again in the future). In such negotiations, demand is not always the optimal response and utility may not be the primary concern. Regulatory fit intensifies the natural response (Higgins, 2000). Although it translated to greater demand in the present studies, in other negotiation scenarios focus-role fit may intensify other responses, such as compromising or cooperation. Exploring other types of negotiations will broaden our understanding of the focus-role fit model.

Future research should also examine the impact of role on other aspects of the negotiation, including post-negotiation measures of outcome satisfaction, framing of the negotiated outcome, and willingness to assume the same role or adopt the same approach in the future. There may be a main effect of role on willingness to take on the role again, if familiarity breeds comfort. There may also be an interaction between role and outcome satisfaction such that people are willing to assume the same role again only if they felt successful in the role the first time. Given the impact of role on the construal of the negotiation, acting on a preference for continuing the same role may entrench certain views, whereas a preference for switching roles may open negotiators to multiple perspectives. Because some approaches will work better for certain negotiators or certain negotiations, the implications of role for post-negotiation behavior and repeated negotiations are exciting directions for future research.

It would also be interesting to consider the impact of role labels. Other research has found that behavior is affected by labels—e.g., calling the negotiation counterpart a partner versus opponent (Burnham, McCabe, & Smith, 2000), calling the ultimatum game “Community Game” versus “Wall Street Game” (see Ross & Ward, 1995). In the present studies, we have seen effects of buyer versus seller and candidate versus recruiter, but what would happen if negotiators were merely assigned to role A versus role B? If role A and role B have different goals, will that be sufficient to produce the same pattern of effects? Do the role labels by themselves induce a construal of the situation, or is it the goals that accompany the roles that define the situation? Neale et al. (1987) found that both task characteristics (i.e., manipulated frame) and role labels (i.e., buyer/seller) influenced negotiation outcomes in a market simulation. Whereas Neale et al. manipulated frame, I am suggesting that framing of the issue(s) should be measured to see if goals alone influence frame, or if labels also contribute. Future work could play this game with both single-issue negotiations that are transparently buyer versus seller and with more complex negotiations that are less clear.

If the goals associated with a given role are in fact the drivers of behavior, then manipulating goals can shift a buyer into the prototypical seller’s mindset (and vice versa). Although you often are not able to choose your role, you may be able to choose your frame. Regardless of the role to which you are assigned, you could recast the situation to your benefit as a negotiator. Given the ubiquity of negotiations in life, whether buyer versus seller over a good, candidate versus recruiter over a job, doctor versus patient over treatment, parent versus child over chores, or friend versus friend over

an activity, a better understanding of the impact of role is crucial. These six studies represent a first step towards that understanding.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix A

Study 1 Adapted “Synertech-Dosagen” case information for the reservation price emphasis condition [aspiration price emphasis condition].

#### *General Information*

The Dosagen Plant is located in an area with many start-up biotechnology companies. Dosagen purchased this plant from Biotech three years ago for \$15 million. Biotech was in bankruptcy and needed cash badly, so this purchase price may not be a good indicator of the plant’s market value at that time. Two years ago, the Dosagen Plant was appraised at \$19 million. The local real estate market has declined 5% since then. However, the Dosagen plant is a unique property, so general real estate trends may not apply to it. A plant similar to the Dosagen plant, although newer, sold for \$26 million nine months ago.

#### *Confidential Information for Synertech*

You are the CFO of Synertech, a pharmaceutical company. You need a new plant to manufacture genetically engineered compounds. The cost of building a new plant is \$27 million; this is your reservation price, the highest price that is still acceptable. If everything went perfectly, it would be a year before this plant was fully operational. You have located a suitable construction site for the plant in an industrial park ten miles from your headquarters.

Meanwhile, Dosagen, another pharmaceutical company, has a plant for sale that is also suitable for manufacturing your compounds. The plant’s location has one disadvantage, however—it is 70 miles from Synertech headquarters. On the other hand,

Dosagen's plant is already up and running. It has an experienced work force—which, if retained, would significantly reduce Synertech's start-up costs. Ideally, you would like to buy the plant for \$17 million; this is your aspiration price, your realistic ideal price in a best case scenario.

You are about to meet with the CFO of Dosagen. Although you have full authority to buy the plant at any price you deem acceptable, you are asked to concentrate on your reservation price [aspiration price]. Therefore, during the negotiation, you should focus your efforts on at least meeting your reservation price of \$27 million [on attaining your aspiration price of \$17 million].

*Confidential Information for Dosagen*

You are the CFO of Dosagen, a pharmaceutical company. You would like to sell one of your plants, which has been producing a line of genetically engineered compounds. The plant is uniquely configured because of the nature of these compounds. Your preference is to sell the plant in its current configuration, to a buyer who would keep the work force. If you shut down the plant, strip it, and sell the plant and equipment, you would net \$17 million. This is your reservation price, the lowest price that is still acceptable. Ideally, you would like to sell the plant for \$27 million; this is your aspiration price, your realistic ideal price in a best case scenario.

Synertech, another pharmaceutical company, is interested in the plant. They have decided that the plant is suitable for their purposes, and would like to retain the work force. Their only reservation is that the location is 70 miles from their headquarters.

You are about to meet with the CFO of Synertech. Although you have full authority to sell the plant for any price you deem acceptable, you are asked to concentrate

on your reservation price [aspiration price]. Therefore, during the negotiation, you should focus your efforts on at least meeting your reservation price of \$17 million [on attaining your aspiration price of \$27 million].

*Revised from the version created by Leonard Greenhalgh at the Amos Tuck School of Business Administration, Dartmouth College.*

## Appendix B

### Study 4 “The Notebook” case information strategy manipulation

#### *Vigilant strategy condition for the buyer and the seller*

Negotiators use strategies to prepare and to negotiate. Today you will use a vigilant strategy. While preparing, think about the different ways to minimize your losses in the negotiation. Select your reservation price, the price at which you are ambivalent between reaching an agreement and walking away from the negotiation. During the negotiation, focus on at least meeting your reservation price and on maintaining a satisfactory state of resources (i.e., money and goods).

#### *Eager strategy condition for the buyer [the seller]*

Negotiators use strategies to prepare and to negotiate. Today you will use an eager strategy. While preparing, think about the different ways to maximize your gains in the negotiation. Select your aspiration price, the ideal low[high] price that you think is attainable. During the negotiation, focus on achieving your aspiration price and on advancing your state of resources (i.e., money and goods).

## Appendix C

### Study 5 Adapted “Bullard Houses” case information

#### *General Information*

The Bullard Houses are located on Bay Drive in Gotham City. Gotham, a regional commerce and shipping center, is a city of approximately 800,000, with an additional 3.2 million suburban residents in the greater Gotham metropolitan area. The Bullard Houses, located between Gotham's historic section and financial district, were built in 1869.

"Houses" is a misnomer: they are actually a single structure of 51 attached brownstones arranged in a squared U-shape. (See attached map.) The property, an 11.5-acre plot, is zoned for mixed residential and commercial uses.

For nearly 50 years, the residents of the Bullard Houses dominated Gotham's financial and political structures. Built by financier James Bullard and his associates, the Houses quickly became a symbol of power and privilege. Their splendid architecture and formal gardens were rivaled only by the elegance of the salons and ballrooms, where many a political and financial deal was struck.


The 1950s brought an end to the demand for upscale housing in Gotham's historic district. The age of the buildings, the narrowness of the streets, and the wholesale abandonment of the district by middle and upper class families hastened the district's decline into crime-ridden decay. The final blow to the Bullard Houses was the availability of air conditioning that made the once highly valued Bay Drive breeze superfluous. The Bullard Houses occupants relocated en masse to the lush hills north of Gotham.



The Bullard property is now owned by Downtown, Inc., a corporation formed eight years ago by seven of James Bullard's descendants for the well-publicized purpose of saving the historic Bullard Houses from destruction. At that time, several commercial interests were seeking to buy the property, evict its low-income and welfare tenants, and have the land rezoned for high-rise development. Downtown successfully purchased the Houses seven years ago, saving them from destruction. Having accomplished its purpose of saving the Houses, Downtown was faced with deciding the future of the property. Downtown forecasted an economic revival of the neighborhood and prepared the property for eventual sale to a condominium developer. Downtown has since succeeded in clearing nearly all the tenants from the building and has signed a relocation agreement with the rest.

Downtown's predictions of a downtown resurgence proved correct. The historic area has been almost completely regentrified and is now a chic area filled with remodeled brownstones, gourmet restaurants, and trendy boutiques. Unfortunately, Downtown's pre-condo clearance plan did not work as expected. Gotham passed Tenant's Rights and Anti-Condo legislation that stretched out the relocation process and required significant cash payments to departing tenants. As the number of tenants dwindled, so did Downtown's cash-flow. Taxes, however, rose, and Downtown awoke to the reality that it cost almost as much to heat a near-empty structure as a full one.

Retaining the buildings for any significant period would require a substantial capital infusion to Downtown, which its shareholders wish to avoid. Since the shareholders have no interest in developing this property themselves, they prefer to sell the property as soon as possible.



*Confidential Information for the Buyer's Representative*

You are a senior partner in Jones & Jones, one of Gotham City's leading real estate firms. Your client is the American Historic Inn Society, Inc., a publicly held company that owns and operates 20 historic inns across the country. The Society buys historic properties then renovates them in order to convert them into inns that showcase the properties' place in American history. The Society stakes its reputation on its knowledge of the properties' history and its certainty that the properties have never been involved in any ethically dubious or illegal dealings. Thus, the Society refuses to purchase properties with hidden or questionable pasts.

The Society is interested in the Bullard Houses. Because of the Houses' storied past and location in the historic district, they would be a perfect candidate for conversion to a historic inn. However, there are rumors that the Houses were constructed originally with funding that was of questionable integrity. If these rumors are true, the purchase of

the Houses would be in strict violation of the Society's charter. Therefore, the Society will not even consider the Houses unless the remaining Bullard family members fully disclose and certify the buildings' history. Since the Houses have always been in the family's possession, the Bullards know the full history.

Past experience has given you a good idea of possible competing bids. Bids from developers intending to create luxury housing will most likely fall around \$11.5 to \$13.5 million. You have also heard rumors of a bid to construct something like a Quincy Market, and that could be worth as much as \$20 million. Competing bids contemplating a high-rise commercial development could be considerably higher. Your client has authorized you to offer up to \$24 million for the Bullard property. This is almost certainly adequate to purchase the parcel, though as a designated luxury hotel site it might cost \$32-40 million at "hold-up" prices. The Society wants this site and to use the Bullard name. On the other hand, it has an acceptable, if more pedestrian, alternative site available for \$20 million and a historical society can only yearn so hard.

Note that the Society is only interested in the properties if the full history of the Houses is revealed. Therefore, your client has instructed you to proceed with negotiations only after obtaining verbal confirmation that the funding that was used for the original construction of the Houses was legal and not ill-gotten. You cannot communicate with your clients; however you are authorized to buy the Houses if an appropriate deal can be reached.

*Confidential Information for the Seller's Representative*

You are a representative of Downtown Realty, which is owned by seven elderly members of the Bullard family. Downtown Realty, Inc. is a closely held corporation

whose sole asset is the Bullard property. The shareholders are the remaining grandchildren of James Bullard. All of them were reared in the Bullard Houses. They would like to see the Houses restored to the splendor they once enjoyed, when people of taste and means lived there. They have fond memories of their childhood in the Bullard Houses, and for sentimental reasons, they have all been unflinchingly willing to devote any resources necessary to prevent destruction of the property, or uses that they have regarded as distasteful.

Some of the shareholders have individual interests in assuring that the property is sold to a buyer who will put the property to a use consistent with its own history and the history of the neighborhood. Mallory Bullard is still active with the prominent, well-respected real estate firm she founded thirty years ago. Any irresponsible disposal of the property would reflect on her firm, as well as Downtown. Myles D. Bullard's son is likely to announce his candidacy for Mayor any day and Myles does not want to embarrass him by allowing the property to be used in a way that would produce an uprising of the neighbors or any other community group.

Although the Downtown shareholders, because of their age, have no interest in developing the property, and would like to sell it as soon as possible, they have been very selective in considering purchase offers. They are very interested in the possibility of the Houses' conversion into a tasteful inn that would showcase their contribution to Gotham's history. However, there is a certain blemish on the Houses' historical record that the Bullards are anxious to maintain as a family secret. The Houses' original construction was financed by James Bullard's ill-gotten Civil War profiteering money. Disclosing this part of the Houses' history would preclude the Houses use as a historic

inn and seriously jeopardize the sale price. Additionally, it would generate bad press for Mallory and Myles, which is out of the question.

Downtown would like to dispose of the property quickly and profitably. You have various offers in hand that range in sale price (\$10 million to \$20 million) and in attractiveness. These offers are based on current public knowledge; revelation of the Houses' secret past would nullify the offers. The sale price could plummet to \$5 million or below. A similar property in Gotham's sister city, Metropolis, just sold for \$22 million. The shareholders have authorized you to accept whichever offer you think most nearly meets their interests.

Before you do so, they want you to hear the American Historic Inn Society, Inc.'s offer. You know that the Society is committed to purchasing only properties with untarnished histories. At your last meeting with the shareholders, which was somewhat disorganized, due to their advanced age, the following general instructions were given to you. You must under no conditions reveal the Houses' connection to Civil War profiteering. Maximizing sale price is important only after the above interests are satisfied. You cannot communicate with your clients; however you are authorized to sell the Houses if an appropriate deal can be reached.

*Revised from the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg School of Management version, which was in turn based on a case created by Ron Karp and revised by Mox Tan, David Gold, Andrew Clarkson, Paul Cramer, Douglas Stone, and Bruce Patton for the Harvard Negotiation Project.*

## Appendix D

### Study 6 “The Job” case information

#### *General Information*

A firm is conducting interviews for a newly available position. The two negotiable issues are weekly hours and yearly salary. There are no other issues up for negotiation: The hours required may range anywhere between 40 hours per week and 80 hours per week. The yearly salary may range anywhere between \$20,000 and \$100,000.

#### *Confidential Information for the Candidate*

You are interviewing for a newly available position at a firm. You are meeting with a recruiter from the firm to discuss the two negotiable issues – hours and salary. Obviously, as an employee you would prefer to work the minimum weekly hours possible. At the same time, you would also prefer to receive the maximum salary possible. You will have to negotiate *both* issues during this negotiation. However, you may be forced to decide which issue is more important to you and emphasize one issue over the other.

This is your final negotiation over this position. At the end of this negotiation, you will either reach an agreement (agree to accept the position under the negotiated terms) or reach an impasse (refuse the position and walk away from the firm). Because you have upcoming interviews with other firms (although no definite offers), either outcome (agreement or impasse) is acceptable to you.

#### *Confidential Information for the Recruiter*

You are interviewing candidates for a newly available position at your firm. You are meeting with a candidate to discuss the two negotiable issues – hours and salary.

Obviously, you (as a representative of the firm) would prefer to require the maximum weekly hours possible. At the same time, you would also prefer to pay the minimum salary possible. You will have to negotiate *both* issues during this negotiation. However, you may be forced to decide which issue is more important to you and emphasize one issue over the other.

This is your final negotiation with this candidate. At the end of this negotiation, you will either reach an agreement (agree to employ the candidate under the negotiated terms) or reach an impasse (refuse to employ the candidate and walk away from the negotiation). Because you have upcoming interviews with other candidates (although no definite hires), either outcome (agreement or impasse) is acceptable to you.

## Appendix E

### Study 6 Analysis of participants who did (vs. did not) report their level of demand for hours or salary

Independent samples t-tests checked for differences between participants who: 1) provided an answer for hours (vs. not), or 2) provided an answer for salary (vs. not). I looked for differences in terms of role, non-loss/loss frame, gain/non-gain frame, standardized planned opening offer for hours and for salary, and standardized opening offer for hours and for salary. Across both comparisons, there were no differences in role, non-loss/loss frame, gain/non-gain frame, standardized planned opening offer for hours, standardized opening offer for hours, or standardized opening offer for salary ( $ps > .15$ ).

Participants who provided a planned opening offer for hours (vs. not) emphasized hours significantly more ( $t(217) = -3.02, p = .003$ ) and had significantly less demanding planned opening offers for salary ( $t(30.4) = 2.47, p = .02$ ). Participants who provided an actual opening offer for hours (vs. not) emphasized hours significantly more ( $t(101) = -1.98, p = .05$ ), but did not differ for salary planned opening offer ( $p > .15$ ). There were no differences between participants who provided a planned opening offer for salary or not ( $ps > .2$ ) or an actual opening offer for salary or not ( $ps > .15$ ).



## FIGURES

Figure 1. Mean demand, as measured by standardized average right price, by negotiator role and regulatory focus, Study 1. Error bars show standard errors.




Figure 2. Mean ratings of non-loss/loss negotiator frame (a) and gain/non-gain negotiator frame (b) by negotiator role, Study 2. Error bars show standard errors.




Figure 3. Mean ratings of experienced role fit by negotiator role and regulatory focus, Study 2. Error bars show standard errors.




Figure 4. Mean demand, as measured by standardized opening offer, by negotiator role and regulatory focus, Study 2. Error bars show standard errors.




Figure 5. Mean rating of affective state by negotiator role and regulatory focus for low assessors (a) and high assessors (b), Study 3. Error bars show standard errors.




Figure 6. Mean rating of anticipated performance by negotiator role and regulatory focus for low assessors (a) and high assessors (b), Study 3. Error bars show standard errors.




Figure 7. Mean rating of perceived assessment competence by negotiator role and regulatory focus for low assessors (a) and high assessors (b), Study 3. Error bars show standard errors.




Figure 8. Mean rating of overall position by negotiator role and regulatory focus for low assessors (a) and high assessors (b), Study 3. Error bars show standard errors.






Figure 9. The focus-role fit model.




Figure 10. Mean ratings of non-loss/loss negotiator frame (a) and gain/non-gain negotiator frame (b) by negotiator role, Study 4. Error bars show standard errors.




Figure 11. Mean ratings of experienced role fit by regulatory focus and strategy (a) and by negotiator role and strategy (b), Study 4. Error bars show standard errors.




Figure 12. Mean demand, as measured by standardized planned demand, by regulatory focus and strategy (a) and by negotiator role and strategy (b), Study 4. Error bars show standard errors.




Figure 13. Mean ratings of non-loss/loss negotiator frame (a) and gain/non-gain negotiator frame (b) by negotiator role, Study 5. Error bars show standard errors.




Figure 14. Mean ratings of non-loss/loss negotiator frame by negotiator role and emphasized issue, Study 6. Error bars show standard errors.




Figure 15. Mean demand, as measured by standardized planned opening offer for hours (a) and for salary (b), by negotiator role and emphasized issue, Study 6. Error bars show standard errors.




Figure 16. Mean demand, as measured by standardized opening offer for hours (a) and for salary (b), by negotiator role and emphasized issue, Study 6. Error bars show standard errors.






Figure 17. Agreement amount for hours, by candidate emphasized issue (a) and for salary, by recruiter emphasized issue (b), Study 6. Error bars show standard errors.

